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Article 
Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis 
of Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes 
Sara S. Greene,† Parina Patel†† & Katherine 
Porter††† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Policymakers have long had an affinity for chapter 13 con-
sumer bankruptcy, the “reorganization” option for consumers. 
Instead of quick forgiveness of most unsecured debts, consum-
ers enter into three-to-five-year plans to pay back creditors. 
Payments are based on available future income, taking into ac-
count a debtor’s expenses such as house and car payments. The 
idea is appealing both substantively and morally. Creditors get 
some or all of their money paid back, and consumers get to 
keep assets and take steps to do the right thing with repay-
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ment efforts. More than a million families each year struggle to 
repay debts in chapter 13 bankruptcy.1 
The hard facts on chapter 13, however, are difficult to 
mesh with the positive sentiments.2 Study after study,3 includ-
ing this one that relies on the most recent available data, has 
found that only about one-third of consumers who enter chap-
ter 13 complete their repayment plans and therefore receive a 
discharge of remaining unsecured debts.4 Two out of three con-
sumers dropout before the end of the repayment plan and fail 
to get the broad debt relief of a bankruptcy discharge. For a 
system that devotes tremendous court resources to chapter 13 
bankruptcy and for the bankrupt families that struggle to make 
ends meet, this statistic is disappointing. As previous empirical 
work has shown, most of the debtors who drop out of chapter 13 
almost immediately start struggling with the same financial 
problems they had before filing for bankruptcy, often within 
 
 1. Table F-2, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/f-2/ 
statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2015/12/31 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). With 
301,705 new Chapter 13 filings for 2015, and chapter 13 cases lasting up to 
five years, we conservatively estimate there are 500,000 pending chapter 13 
cases in the United States. 
 2. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
Who Uses Chapter 13?, in CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
269, 273 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds., 2003) (“The ideological mar-
keting of Chapter 13 appears to be in sharp contrast with practical realities 
facing the debtors.”). 
 3. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE 
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER 
CREDIT IN AMERICA 17, 217 (1989) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS] (estimating that one-third of 
1529 chapter 13 cases in their study completed plan payments); Gordon 
Bermant & Ed Flynn, Measuring Projected Performance in Chapter 13: Com-
parisons Across the States, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July/Aug. 2000, at 22, 22 
(stating that chapter 13 completion rates hover nationally at about one-third 
of confirmed plans); Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education 
in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 557, 571 (2001) (reporting five judicial districts’ chapter 13 com-
pletion rates in 1994, which ranged from 18.2% to 54.9%); Henry E. Hilde-
brand III, Administering Chapter 13—At What Price?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
July/Aug. 1994, at 16, 16 (reporting that chapter 13 trustees estimated a com-
pletion rate of 32.89% based on their experiences); Scott Norberg & Andrew J. 
Velkey, Debtor Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 476 (2006) (reporting a 33% discharge rate in seven-
district sample); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice: 
Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in 
Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 411 (1994) (stating that the 
national average reported rate in 1993 for completed cases was 31%). 
 4. See infra Table 1 (reporting that among a national sample of cases 
filed in 2007, 36.5% of chapter 13 cases did not received a discharge). 
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just weeks of the dismissal.5 The help from bankruptcy was 
temporary;6 only completing the bankruptcy repayment plan 
could ensure that property such as a home was kept from credi-
tors and that creditors did not return to dunning and debt col-
lection.7 
Despite this enduring reality, there has never been a na-
tional study of chapter 13 plan completion that applies statisti-
cal methods to predict a debtor’s success in chapter 13. This 
study is the first.8 Its findings upset longstanding assumptions 
 
 5. Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of Bank-
ruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103, 112 (2011). 
 6. Id. (“The data show that families temporarily accomplished these 
goals during the time they were in Chapter 13. . . . Once their cases were dis-
missed, the relief quickly evaporated.”). 
 7. Id. at 162 (“Nearly all of the two in three families that file Chapter 13 
and later drop out of their repayment plans do so in precarious financial 
straits. The majority of homeowners seem poised to lose their homes, and fam-
ilies are already experiencing an uptick in collection pressure.”). 
 8. A few of the plan completion studies cited in note 3, supra, have gone 
further and attempted an empirical analysis of the factors that are associated 
with plan completion. For the reasons noted below, none of these studies had 
nearly the scope of sample (national and random), richness of data (debtor 
surveys, court records, and district practices), and statistical sophistication 
(logistic regression and theory-driven modeling) of this Article. Because of the 
constraints of the prior work, only sharply limited inferences from the findings 
were possible. See Braucher, supra note 3, at 579 (reporting results from re-
gression analysis using four independent variables that reflected district-wide 
practices and one variable at the case-level, and cautioning that “[r]elevant 
variables such as individual debtor characteristics that could affect income 
and expenses over the course of the plan may predict completion rates far bet-
ter than this analysis, which explains less than 10 percent of the variance”); 
David A. Evans & Jean M. Lown, Predictors of Chapter 13 Completion Rates: 
The Role of Socioeconomic Variables and Consumer Debt Type, 29 J. FAM. 
ECON. ISSUES 202 (2008) (using a sample drawn solely from cases filed in 
Utah, with no survey data on debtors’ demographics and reasons for filing, 
and no ability to measure variation across districts because of single-district 
design); Scott Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical 
Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 415 (1999) (using comparative tests (t-tests and chi-square tests) rather 
than regression to predict outcomes from court record (non-survey) data on 
seventy-one case samples from a single judicial district, the Southern District 
of Mississippi); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 475, 479–82 (conducting 
tests of comparison or correlation (chi-square and t-tests) on variables drawn 
from court records on a sample of cases from seven judicial districts located in 
five states, which the authors characterized as “national study”). In our view, 
Norberg and Velkey’s study is the most comprehensive prior to ours. We re-
spectfully disagree with the authors’ characterization that their sample is “na-
tional,” given its approximate half-dozen or so judicial districts. See infra Part 
I (reporting that our sample was randomly selected from cases filed in all 
states and judicial districts and contains cases from eighty-one of the ninety 
judicial districts in the United States). 
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and challenge prior research on how bankruptcy works. Indeed, 
only when we know what might set apart the minority of suc-
cessful debtors can we design changes that could fix the broken 
bankruptcy system. 
While it may be hard to believe that there has never been a 
study such as ours of chapter 13 success, a key reason is data 
limitations. Even with advances in technology, our study neces-
sarily involved hand coding hundreds of variables and adminis-
tering surveys. Data available from the required bankruptcy 
forms,9 which are much easier to collect electronically, simply 
cannot create a convincing model with adequate relevant vari-
ables. Robust effects also require careful model building such 
as awareness of collinearity and variable construction. But it is 
not just a lack of data or statistical analyses that has created 
the gap in knowledge. Several misperceptions about bankrupt-
cy have contributed to a perception that our goal of predicting 
success in chapter 13 bankruptcy was either impossible or elu-
sive. 
We believe that a misinterpretation of an idea that took 
hold over thirty years ago, when leading scholars Teresa Sulli-
van, (now-Senator) Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook in-
troduced the concept of “local legal culture” to bankruptcy 
scholarship, has retarded certain research questions.10 Local le-
gal culture is the theory that even when the formal law is the 
same or similar across locations, perceptions, expectations, 
practice variation, and beliefs can change the reality of law.11 In 
their seminal piece, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued 
that “local legal culture exercises a pervasive, systematic influ-
ence on the operation of the federal bankruptcy system” and 
 
 9. The official bankruptcy forms mandate a petition for relief and over a 
dozen “schedules” of assets, debts, income, and expenses. Bankruptcy Forms, 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2016). These forms are filed under penalty of perjury. Id. 
 10. Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The 
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal 
Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801 (1994). The theory of “local 
legal culture” was initially used as a residual explanation for variations in 
chapter 13 outcomes that the researchers’ data could not otherwise explain. 
Id. 
 11. Id. at 804 (defining local legal culture as “systematic and persistent 
variations in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of perceptions 
and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials in a particular lo-
cality, and differing in identifiable ways from the practices, perceptions, and 
expectations existing in other localities subject to the same or a similar formal 
legal regime”). 
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pointed to variations in chapter 13 practice as an example of 
such effects.12 They argued that future research should be sen-
sitive to local legal culture and that analysis of the bare law 
was insufficient.13 
The original theory of local legal culture, which calls on re-
searchers to be aware of regional variations and to account for 
them in their statistical analyses,14 gradually morphed into an 
explanation for why the persistently poor outcomes in bank-
ruptcy could not be rigorously examined. For example, in re-
sponse to data about the dismal discharge rates in chapter 13, 
the reply would be: rely on the widespread variation in dis-
charge rates to argue that chapter 13 can work.15 Actors in the 
bankruptcy system report that “their districts” are different in 
numerous and unseen ways, arguing that unless the research 
studied their local, impliedly better way of doing things, a 
study’s findings were unpersuasive.16 
This Article rejects this analytical approach as an overly 
expansive application of the theory of local legal culture—one 
that its original proponents, dyed-in-the-wool empiricists them-
selves—undoubtedly never intended. Indubitably, differences 
based on local practice are aspects of the system. We can re-
spond to local differences in practice, in debtor demographics, 
and in other variations in this Article because our comprehen-
sive data collection and analysis have allowed us to do two key 
things: (1) control for judicial district variation in our models; 
and (2) test local practices in chapter 13 that are often relied on 
to explain differences in outcomes. 
Additionally, we can assess a host of other previously hy-
pothesized, but never tested, potential predictors of who fares 
well in chapter 13. Indeed, in this Article, we return to the sci-
 
 12. Id. at 806. 
 13. Id. at 857–65. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Porter, supra note 5, at 109 (describing benefits of chapter 13 oth-
er than discharge); William C. Whitford, Small Ball, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 
9, 12 (2011) (noting that uses of chapter 13 vary dramatically by judicial dis-
trict). 
 16. Porter, supra note 5, at 153; see Robin R. Randolph, Chapter 13: Get-
ting to Completion, CONSIDER CHAPTER 13 (June 19, 2016), http:// 
considerchapter13.org/2016/06/19/chapter-13-getting-to-completion (disagree-
ing with critics of chapter 13 and arguing that “deeper study, however, of 
chapter 13 plan completion rates at the federal judicial district level reveals 
successes that should be duplicated in every district” and offering up “coopera-
tion and collegiality” as an example of a local best practice that can influence 
debtor outcomes). 
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entific approach that Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook pio-
neered to understand bankruptcy. We use comprehensive hand-
gathered data, contextual knowledge of bankruptcy law and its 
practice, and robust statistical modeling to study chapter 13 
outcomes. Our analysis is the first to combine these three ap-
proaches despite the lamentations about chapter 13. Our rich 
data come from a national sample, the 2007 Consumer Bank-
ruptcy Project of 770 chapter 13 cases.17 It is also the only na-
tional data set that has comprehensive demographic character-
istics about filers. 
Some of our most important findings revolve around what 
does not predict debt reduction in bankruptcy. Wage orders and 
payment of mortgages by trustees through repayment plans, 
both features that some herald as best practices and are prof-
fered as explanations for why certain districts outperform oth-
ers, are not determinants of completing a chapter 13 case.18 
Our findings about what does predict bankruptcy outcomes 
are disquieting. Blacks have less than half the chance of bank-
ruptcy success as non-blacks;19 this worsens the recent insight 
that blacks are overrepresented in bankruptcy because of at-
torney steering to chapter 13.20 More than amount of debt, prior 
bankruptcies, or having a job—all features that the bankruptcy 
system does account for in considering a person’s eligibility for 
chapter 13—race matters. 
Debtors with young children also have a reduced likelihood 
of bankruptcy debt relief.21 And the more dependent children 
the person has, the less likely bankruptcy will work to right the 
family financially.22 We link these findings to the expense in-
stability and income volatility that are associated with young 
children.23 Similarly, we find a correlation between medical in-
surance coverage and success in bankruptcy, probably due to 
its role in buffering expenses that can derail repaying credi-
tors.24 
 
 17. See infra note 34. 
 18. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See infra Part II.B. 
 20. Tara Siegel Bernard, Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A1. 
 21. See infra Part II.B. 
 22. See infra Part II.B. 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
 24. See infra Part II.D. 
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As previous research has suggested, attorneys also matter 
in chapter 13. Outcomes for debtors without an attorney are 
particularly grim as they face a likely probability of discharge 
well below ten percent.25 This has profound policy implications 
for policymakers, particularly in light of the increased push for 
“self-help” in the legal system.26 
Finally, homeownership is a key factor in determining suc-
cess.27 The less affordable someone’s housing is, given his or her 
income, the less likely he or she is to succeed in chapter 13.28 
Further, a person who reports preventing foreclosure as a rea-
son for seeking bankruptcy is less likely to succeed than some-
one who entered chapter 13 for any other reason. This finding 
calls into question the efficacy of chapter 13 as a home-saving 
device.29 Entering chapter 13 to preserve a home—precisely one 
of its vaunted benefits compared to the chapter 7 liquidation 
alternative—predisposes a debtor to exiting bankruptcy with-
out a discharge of unsecured debt.30 Combining this finding 
with Porter’s prior work that most debtors who exit chapter 13 
do not save their homes—they only delay an inevitable foreclo-
sure31—is a serious impeachment of the current tools in chapter 
13 for ailing struggling homeowners.32 
 
 25. See Angela Littwin, The Do-It-Yourself Mirage Complexity in the 
Bankruptcy System, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 
157, 166 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012) (reporting that in a 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project sample, 91.3% of chapter 13 pro se cases were dismissed 
before confirmation). 
 26. James Greiner et al., Self-Help, Reimagined, 92 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 
2016) (“A significant part of the access to justice toolkit must include self-help 
materials.”). For a description of a particular self-help intervention in the con-
sumer debt context, see generally Dalie Jimenez et al., Improving the Lives of 
Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Re-
search and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449 (2013) 
(“[D]escrib[ing] a proposed [Randomized Control Trial] to evaluate two inter-
ventions that are part of contemporary attempts to assist consumers in finan-
cial distress, one from legislators and the other from legal services provid-
ers.”). 
 27. See infra Part II.A. 
 28. See John Eggum et al., Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Afford-
ability and Loan Modification, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1123, 1141 (describing as 
“grim” the finding that fewer than three in ten homeowners in chapter 13 
bankruptcy had affordable housing costs). 
 29. But see Mark R. Lindblad et al., Bankruptcy During Foreclosure: 
Home Preservation Through Chapters 7 and 13, 25 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 41, 
61 (2015) (finding that bankruptcy, particularly chapter 13 bankruptcy, reduc-
es the likelihood of foreclosure). 
 30. See infra Part II.A. 
 31. Porter, supra note 5, at 147–48; see also Lindblad et al., supra note 29, 
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In this Article, we further discuss these findings and other 
significant determinants of chapter 13 success. In Part I, we 
describe the methodology. In Part II, we present multiple, 
debtor-level models to predict outcomes in chapter 13 from a 
random national sample. We construct four different models 
based on existing empirical literature, theories of bankruptcy 
law and family economic security, and law reform ideas. The 
first model examines financial characteristics. The second mod-
el analyses demographic variables. The third model tests case 
procedures. The fourth model estimates the influence of factors 
that contribute to a household’s economic security. 
We test each model using logistic regression, with a binary 
positive outcome of a debtor receiving a chapter 13 discharge. 
We use random effects, a statistical tool, to control for unob-
servable or unmeasurable effects at the level of judicial dis-
tricts. The models identify several predictors of chapter 13 
completion—and suggest some areas where prior assumptions 
about how to improve chapter 13 for debtors may be misplaced. 
For example, we are unable to find support for the idea that in-
creased strictures by trustees related to wages or mortgage 
payments help debtors. 
In Part III, the predictors from the four separate models 
retain statistical significance in a final model. We discuss the 
theoretical significance of the final model predictors and dis-
cuss how they contribute to understanding the various forces 
and actors that shape bankruptcy outcomes. Part IV of the Ar-
ticle explores how our findings support the need for reform to 
bankruptcy law and policy. We identify some specific changes 
for consideration, based on our findings, and also develop a 
blueprint for further theoretical and empirical study. 
Chapter 13 is a cornerstone of the bankruptcy system. We 
need accurate information about why the majority of millions of 
families that seek chapter 13’s refuge will not achieve the debt 
relief of a discharge. Revisions and changes based on empirical 
 
at 52, tbl.3 (reporting that of those who filed bankruptcy after a foreclosure 
was started, approximately half have either lost their home to foreclosure or 
the house remains in foreclosure despite months or years elapsing since the 
bankruptcy). 
 32. Chapter 13 allows debtors to cure missed past payments over time but 
expressly prohibits reducing the principal or making other modifications to the 
going-forward terms of the loan. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), (b)(5) (2012). See gen-
erally Eggum et al., supra note 28, at 1154–64 (summarizing history, ra-
tionale, and possible reforms of treatment of home mortgages in chapter 13 
cases). 
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data from a national sample can direct us to reforms of chapter 
13 practice that are likely to be helpful across the country. At 
stake is improved access to the fresh start of a bankruptcy dis-
charge and a legal system that delivers the help that families 
need to right themselves financially. 
I.  METHODOLOGY   
In this Part, we detail our methods. We describe the sam-
ple, the construction of the dependent variable, and the logistic 
regression analysis. Given our interest in untangling the influ-
ence of local legal culture on case outcomes, we made sure we 
had a geographically widespread, national sample of cases. We 
also used statistical methods to control for district-level effects 
that might influence whether debtors receive a discharge. 
A. 2007 CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY PROJECT 
The 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (“CBP”) is a part 
of an iterative study on people who file bankruptcy. The first 
CBP was conducted in 1981, with subsequent studies conducted 
in 1991, 2001, and 2007. Another CBP study is ongoing with 
data collection having begun in 2013.33 The 2007 version of the 
CBP is the first national random sample of households that 
filed for bankruptcy following the changes to the consumer 
bankruptcy law in 2005.34 The investigators believed that the 
bankruptcy system had stabilized sufficiently following the ef-
fective date of the law in October 2005 to make 2007 cases fair-
ly representative of the likely future cases.35 
 
 33. The principal investigators in this study, Robert M. Lawless, Kathe-
rine Porter, and Deborah K. Thorne, are also coding court records and survey-
ing debtors. These data will not be available for analysis of chapter 13 comple-
tion until at least five years from filing dates when the repayment plan terms 
have ended. The data in this Article, from cases filed in 2007, is the most cur-
rent available, as data collection could not be completed until 2013. We needed 
to allow six years, as some cases did not begin five-year repayment plans until 
one year after the filing date. 
 34. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 
(BAPCPA) of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.). 
 35. Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.E. 
Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform 
Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 354 
(2008) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform] (“These trends led us to 
conclude that 2007 would yield a representative data pool of post-BAPCPA 
cases . . . .”). While we agree, we also note that the depth of the foreclosure cri-
sis in 2008 and continuing changes in household balance sheets could have 
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Data from this Article come from the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project (hereinafter all references to the “CBP” will 
refer to the 2007 version unless otherwise noted) and subse-
quent follow-up data collected on the initial 2007 sample. The 
sample for the 2007 CBP was drawn from a national random 
sample of bankruptcy filers using the Automated Access to 
Court Electronic Records (AACER) system.36 The sample in-
cluded chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases from eighty-one of the 
ninety federal judicial districts.37 Over a five-week period be-
ginning in the last week of January 2007 through February 
2007, 5000 cases were randomly selected from all judicial dis-
tricts in the United States. The CBP ultimately collected data 
on a subset of these randomly selected consumer bankruptcy 
filers using information from a written questionnaire, court 
records, and telephone interviews (with a subset of 1000 of the 
sample families).38 
First, each of the 5000 randomly selected households re-
ceived a letter from the investigators. The letter briefly de-
scribed the study and told respondents that if they wanted to 
participate, they should complete the survey they would be re-
ceiving in the mail. One week after they received the introduc-
tory letter, potential participants received a questionnaire 
packet. The packet included a cover letter, an eight-page ques-
tionnaire, a stamped return envelope, and two dollars in cash 
as a token of appreciation. Potential participants were sent a 
thank you/reminder letter one week after the initial question-
naire was sent and the research team contacted respondents 
via telephone (when the respondents’ telephone numbers were 
available) to follow-up. A second reminder was sent one month 
 
produced some meaningful changes in the chapter 13 population. That said, 
the most recent data suggest similar demographic and financial profiles for 
2007 and 2013–14 bankruptcy filers. See Robert Lawless, Katherine Porter & 
Deborah Thorne, Struggling to Bankruptcy (May 16, 2016) (unpublished pa-
per) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Lawless et al., Struggling to Bankrupt-
cy]. 
 36. Automated Access to Court Electronic Records (“AACER”) is now part 
of EPIQ Systems. The 2007 national filing data were supplied through the 
generous assistance of Mike Bickford and his colleagues at AACER, a bank-
ruptcy data and management company. 
 37. The sample does not include cases filed in the judicial districts of 
Guam, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, or the Virgin Islands. 
 38. For a complete description of the CBP methodology, see Lawless et al., 
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 387–405. The CBP phone interview data 
was not used for this study and thus a detailed explanation of the methodology 
for that part of the study is not included in this Article. 
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after the initial questionnaire was mailed, with an additional 
two dollars as a token of appreciation encouraging participa-
tion. In July 2007, final letters were sent to respondents who 
had not yet completed the questionnaire. 
The response rate on the surveys was roughly 50%, yield-
ing a total sample of 2521. Investigators analyzed court record 
data from non-respondents to test whether they were statisti-
cally distinguishable from respondents, and they were not.39 
Two-thirds (66%) of the sample was chapter 7 bankruptcies, 
while the remaining 34% were chapter 13 bankruptcies.40 Ap-
proximately 70% of the returned questionnaires were single fil-
ings and 30% were joint filings (filings by married couples).41 
Court records for all debtors who responded to the written 
questionnaire were obtained using the federal government’s 
electronic court record system, PACER. For every case, the 
docket sheet, petition, financial schedules, Statement of Finan-
cial Affairs, and Statement of Intention were downloaded from 
the public records. These forms were coded to obtain infor-
mation on roughly 200 additional variables. These variables in-
cluded financial information about debtors and their house-
holds and about case outcomes.42 Further details on the 2007 
 
 39. Specifically, to test for response bias, CBP researchers coded and ana-
lyzed major financial variables from the court records of 100 non-respondent 
debtors (people who did not return questionnaires and therefore did not partic-
ipate in the study). Income, debts, assets, monthly expenses, and prior bank-
ruptcy status were some of the financial variables that were included in the 
analysis. This data was compared with data collected from the participants 
who constituted the core random sample. The analysis suggested that re-
spondents and non-respondents shared similar characteristics on major finan-
cial variables and thus that there was no significant sample bias. Lawless et 
al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 396. 
 40. According to government data, out of all non-business bankruptcy fil-
ings, approximately 62.3% are chapter 7, and the remaining 37.7% are chapter 
13. The chapter 7 filings in this CBP sample seem somewhat overrepresented. 
To adjust for the inflation in chapter 7 filings, the investigators weight the 
sample size. 
 41. The percentage of joint and single filers in the CBP sample is repre-
sentative of the population of consumer bankruptcy filers. In 2007, approxi-
mately 29% of bankruptcy filers filed a joint petition and the remainder filed a 
single petition. 
 42. The court records were coded by trained law students. The training 
included reading a thirty-eight-page coding manual and a supervised practice 
coding session with one chapter 7 and one chapter 13 case. To test reliability, 
10% of the court records were randomly selected a second time for recoding. 
These selected cases were compared to the original coding and checked for dis-
crepancies and errors. An error rate of 0.8% was reported. 
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CBP, including its funding and acknowledgements of assis-
tance, are available in prior published work.43 
B. OUTCOMES FROM CHAPTER 13 
This study focused on the chapter 13 CBP sample. Chapter 
13 plans may be five years in duration.44 This runs from the 
time of plan confirmation, which itself may follow the chapter 
13 filing by several months. Our goal was to record the final 
outcome in all chapter 13 cases, so we updated the outcomes in 
March 2013. This is a minimum of six years from initial peti-
tion date.45 For three cases, we were unable to categorize the 
outcome.46 These cases were excluded from the sample. 
The table below displays the distribution of outcomes. In 
our sample of cases filed in 2007, the chapter 13 discharge rate 
was slightly higher (36.5%) than the “one-third” statistic that 
has endured for decades.47 While the Bankruptcy Reform Abuse 
& Consumer Protection Act of 2005—as well as the foreclosure 
crisis—may have increased the chapter 13 completion rate in 
the intervening years since 2007, even the most generous sta-
tistics suggest that about half of chapter 13 cases are dismissed 
without a discharge, most commonly for failure of the debtor to 
make the required plan payments.48 
 
 43. For a complete description of the CBP methodology, see Lawless et al., 
Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 387–98. 
 44. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2012). 
 45. Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 391. 
 46. These cases were closed but neither discharged nor dismissed. Rea-
sons could include that a debtor failed to complete the required debtor educa-
tion or was not otherwise eligible for a discharge but the case was never sub-
ject to a motion to dismiss. It was administratively closed. 
 47. See Norberg & Velkey, supra, note 3. 
 48. Table BAPCPA 6 – Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Pro-
tection Act (BAPCPA) (December 31, 2015) U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts 
.gov/statistics/table/bapcpa-6/bankruptcy-abuse-prevention-and-consumer 
-protection-act-bapcpa/2015/12/31 (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). This report cap-
tures all the cases closed in a given one-year period, not the outcomes of cases 
filed in a particular moment in time. The difference in method could produce a 
substantial difference because cases closed in 2015 could have been filed as 
early as 2009, while many dismissed cases are likely to have been filed more 
recently. This is an effect of plan completion taking three to five years, so by 
definition the completed cases were filed at least a few years ago. Dismissed 
cases could have been filed only months before the 2015 case closed report was 
created. 
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Table 1: Chapter 13 Outcomes of Cases in 2007 Sample 
 Percentage Number 
Dismissed, pre-confirmation 17.3 134 
Dismissed, post-confirmation 35.7 276 
Converted, pre-confirmation 1 8 
Converted, post-confirmation 8.5 66 
Pending, plan confirmed .5 4 
Discharged in chapter 13 36.5 282 
Total 100 770 
 
To create a binary variable for regression analysis, we re-
coded the outcomes in Table 1 into two categories: discharged 
and not discharged. We made the assumption that any pending 
cases more than six years from filing would achieve a dis-
charge.49 The distribution of the dependent variable was 286 
cases as “1,” a positive outcome, and 484 as “0,” a negative out-
come. 
Converted cases could be viewed as a success, since the 
conversions were to chapter 7 and nearly all chapter 7 cases 
end in discharge.50 On the other hand, conversion is a more 
time-consuming and expensive path to discharge than making 
an initial chapter 7 filing. While one of us has argued that con-
version should be more widely used as a tool to address the 
struggles of chapter 13,51 that does not make it an optimal out-
come from chapter 13. For simplicity, we chose to use a binary 
dependent variable of discharged or not discharged in a chapter 
13 case. This meant including cases converted to chapter 7 in 
the “not discharged” category, regardless of what happened in 
the converted case. We also rejected ordinal regression as con-
 
 49. While it is possible that something could derail such a case, for it to 
have been pending at our final coding, such debtors all had confirmed plans 
and were in chapter 13 for six years. Sometimes plans are functionally “sus-
pended,” allowing a debtor to skip a payment and add a month to the five-year 
plan, such that the actual period of repayment can exceed five years. These 
are already debtors who have shown years of capacity to pay in chapter 13, 
such that missing a final month or two of payment is highly unlikely. 
 50. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bank-
ruptcy’s Greatest Weakness May Account for its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1933, 1973 tbl. 3a. (2011) (reporting that only 2.5% of chapter 7 
cases in random national sample had a negative outcome of dismissal). 
 51. Porter, supra note 5, at 141. 
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verted cases are not “in between” discharge and no discharge in 
any substantive sense.52 
Additionally, we estimated regression models with a tri-
partite dependent variable: dismissed, converted, and dis-
charged. All independent variables remained significant or not 
significant as in the logistic regression with the binary out-
come. This reinforced our approach of focusing on discharge as 
the sole positive outcome of cases initially filed in chapter 13. 
That is, the only benefit of a considering converted cases as 
separate from dismissed ones would be to reduce the statistical 
power of our analysis by subdividing the outcome variable. 
A binary outcome variable produced an overall discharge 
statistic of 37.14%. It is similar to the discharge rate found in 
nearly all prior studies of multiple districts.53 
C. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression is a statistical technique used to understand 
the impact of variables of interest on a given outcome. In this 
way, researchers can control for the impact of different varia-
bles on the key topic of investigation. This Article uses one kind 
of regression, logistic regression, to predict the outcome in 
chapter 13 cases. Previous work has not used regression models 
at the individual case level to make such predictions. 
In this Article, we use logistic regression to make predic-
tion estimates of the odds of a chapter 13 discharge compared 
to a case ending without discharge. 
Additionally, we used random effects to account for the fact 
that our data includes filers from eighty-one different districts 
 
 
 
 52. Cases converted from chapter 13 to chapter 7 will often result in the 
quick discharge of unsecured debt, but will lack the debt relief related to 
missed payments on secured debts, such as mortgages and car loans. Convert-
ed cases are not a halfway outcome such that they could be treated as an in-
termediate outcome between a fully complete chapter 13 case and a dismissed 
chapter 13 case with no discharge at all. 
 53. See, e.g., Bermant & Flynn, supra note 3 (“Completion rates [for chap-
ter 13 filings] hover nationally at about one-third of confirmed plans . . . .”); 
Hildebrand III, supra note 3 (“The trustees estimated that the completion rate 
of chapter 13 cases averaged 32.89 percent. This is consistent with conven-
tional wisdom that approximately two-thirds of chapter 13 cases fail to reach 
discharge.”); Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 505 (“The overall discharge 
rate for the debtors in the seven districts covered by the Project was exactly 
the oft-repeated statistic of one-third.”). 
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throughout the United States. This technique is appropriate 
given the “local legal culture” research suggesting that chapter 
13 outcomes and practices vary substantially in different judi-
cial districts.54 Using random effects creates a hierarchical 
model structure that recognizes debtors reside in different judi-
cial districts. Random effects also reflect our interest in making 
predictions about chapter 13 discharge to districts not included 
in our sample. If we used fixed effects, making out-of-sample 
predictions (i.e. making predictions of districts not included in 
our sample) is not appropriate since the unit effect for unob-
served districts are unknown. Finally, including random effects 
allows us to be more confident in the output of our models be-
cause random effects produce higher standard errors.55 This re-
duces the likelihood of reporting a statistical significance rela-
tionship between two variables when one does not exist, by 
imposing a higher threshold for the models’ calculations.56 
II.  WHO, WHAT, HOW, AND WHY: DEBTOR AND CASE 
DIFFERENCES   
This Part describes how we grouped the variables into four 
models, each constructed around a theory of what types of fac-
tors might relate to the likelihood of discharge. We eschewed 
the kitchen-sink approach of including all independent varia-
bles in a single analysis. Each model is based on a theory of 
what drives chapter 13 outcomes and the empirical knowledge 
of the system. Model 1, the Debtor Finances model, uses infor-
mation that bankruptcy law requires a debtor to provide to the 
court, the trustee, and creditors. Model 2 reflects demographic 
data (which the law largely deems irrelevant) and which were 
collected by written surveys of debtors sent by the Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project. Model 3, System Process, reflects variables 
that will guide a case process, such as having an attorney, or 
using a wage order to collect payments. The final one, Model 4, 
Household Security, looks at underlying causes of financial in-
stability. 
To a certain extent, the models also use data that generally 
were drawn from the same source (required forms, written sur-
 
 54. Whitford, supra note 15, at 12–13; Whitford, supra note 3 at 408–13. 
 55. WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 316–17 (5th ed. 2002). 
 56. See id. at 183; see also ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA 
ANALYSIS USING REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS 246 
(2007) (recommending that researchers “always use” random effects and ex-
plaining the primary motivations for using multilevel modeling). 
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veys, district-level practices, etc.). This approach to model 
building is useful in developing reform ideas for chapter 13 
based on our findings. That is, to the extent the estimates sug-
gest that district practices are influential, one might focus re-
forms on implementing the beneficial practices. Alternatively, 
if many highly predictive variables are not collected by required 
forms, adding such data may improve chapter 13 counseling 
and confirmation decisions. 
We supplemented the Consumer Bankruptcy Project data 
by gathering additional variables that the prior literature had 
suggested might be relevant to discharge. This was particularly 
useful in building the models that focus on trustee and court 
processes, as the Consumer Bankruptcy Project focused on 
debtor characteristics. These additional data give us the new 
opportunities for analysis of chapter 13 and permit us to study 
interactions between system and debtor characteristics in a 
way never before possible. 
A. DEBTOR FINANCES MODEL 
Bankruptcy is a remedy for those with financial problems, 
so an initial model examining how outcomes vary by debt, in-
come, and assets made intuitive sense. This model also bears 
the most resemblance to prior analyses. Researchers, beginning 
with Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook in the 1980s, collected 
these variables and used them to study the functioning of the 
bankruptcy system.57 Scott Norberg’s and Andrew Velkey’s 
study of chapter 13 is the most expansive example of this ap-
proach, focusing on income and debt characteristics.58 
 For this first model, (hereinafter referred to as the “debt-
or finances” model for shorthand), the data come from debtors’ 
petitions and schedules. The petition and schedules serve as a 
mirror that reflects the bankruptcy system’s decisions of what 
information is necessary for administering cases. The Bank-
ruptcy Code requires the disclosure of information about assets 
and debts.59 The determination of what must be paid to credi-
tors reflects a calculation drawn from disclosures about income 
and expenses.60 
 
 57. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, 
supra note 3, at 17. 
 58. See Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3. 
 59. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2012). 
 60. Id. § 1325(b). 
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Trustees review the petition and schedules, and a debtor 
must appear at a mandatory meeting to answer questions 
about the financial characteristics contained therein.61 The 
debtor finances model contains the “quick facts” that are ascer-
tainable in a minute or two of reviewing a debtor’s case file. If 
this information meaningfully predicts plan completion, trus-
tees could begin to raise objections to plan confirmation imme-
diately in a case.62 Similarly, these are the core facts that are 
being gathered in client counseling by debtors’ attorneys as 
they complete the petition and schedules. All parties have 
ready and immediate access to these debtor characteristics. 
Another notable attribute of the debtor finances model is 
that the variables are highly standardized. The forms are re-
quired in all districts. This reflects a degree of consensus about 
the importance of these characteristics to a legal system of debt 
relief. 
1. Predictor Variables 
The variables in the debtor finances model reflect the most 
important financial characteristics of chapter 13 debtors. We 
tested models that included other variables and also checked 
the variables for collinearity.63 In joint filings, the debts and net 
income reflect the information on both spouses. We also include 
the descriptive statistics of all independent variables in the 
model in Table 2 below. 
a) Net Household Income (in thousands): A continuous 
variable that includes income from all sources, both wage and 
non-wage, less any payroll deductions from wage income. It in-
cludes spousal income in cases when a debtor was married (re-
gardless of whether the bankruptcy was filed jointly or singly). 
b) Unsecured Debt Amount (in thousands): A continuous 
variable that measures the total of unsecured debts listed on 
 
 61. Id. § 341. 
 62. To confirm a chapter 13 plan, a court must determine that “the debtor 
will be able to make all payments under the plan to comply with the plan.” Id. 
§ 1325(a)(6). This is called the “feasibility” requirement as it reflects the debt-
or’s capacity to continue making plan payments for the years of the plan. 
 63. Tests to see if the data met the assumption of collinearity indicated 
that multicollinearity was not a concern (Net Household Income, Toler-
ance=0.49, VIF=2.06; Unsecured Debt Amount, Tolerance=0.88, VIF=1.13; 
Priority Unsecured Debt Amount, Tolerance=0.85, VIF=1.18; Secured Debt 
Amount, Tolerance=0.50, VIF=1.99; Unaffordable Housing, Tolerance=0.90, 
VIF=1.11). 
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each debtor’s Schedule F.64 Any debts entitled to priority re-
payment, such as domestic support, are not included. 
c) Priority Unsecured Debt Amount (in thousands): A con-
tinuous variable that represents the total of priority unsecured 
debts listed on each debtor’s Schedule E. Only 38% of the sam-
ple owed some priority debt. Priority debt includes tax and ali-
mony debt. In the sample, about 31% of the sample had tax 
debt and 4% had alimony debt. 
d) Secured Debt Amount (in thousands): A continuous var-
iable that measures the total of secured debts on each debtor’s 
Schedule D. This includes mortgage debt and car debt. 
e) Unaffordable Housing: This variable represents the to-
tal amount of housing expenses divided by household gross in-
come. This variable was calculated for both renters and home-
owners. Total housing costs include the rent/mortgage payment 
and utility payments (electricity, gas, water, etc.). Gross income 
was used in calculating the ratio because this is the standard 
measure in the housing literature. The resulting housing cost 
data were split into three categories and recoded based on the 
existing literature on housing affordability. If the debtors spent 
0% to 30% of their household income on housing costs, it was 
coded as affordable. If the debtors spent between 31% and 50% 
of household gross income on housing coasts, it was coded as 
unaffordable. If the debtors spent more than 50% of their 
household gross income on housing costs, it was coded as se-
verely unaffordable.65 The higher numerical codes correspond to 
more unaffordability, and 69.77% of debtor households had af-
fordable housing. 
f) Homeowner: This is a dichotomous variable that reflects 
whether a debtor owned a home or did not own a home at the 
time of chapter 13 filing. It was recoded from the answers given 
in the written survey that asked the debtors to describe their 
living situations at the time of filing. If a debtor lived with fam-
ily or friends, regardless of whether rent was paid, the debtor 
 
 64. The bankruptcy schedules in use in 2007 did not make it possible to 
readily distinguish what was likely non-dischargeable student loan debt from 
other unsecured debts. New forms went into effect in December 2015 that will 
permit later researchers to make this distinction and examine student loans in 
bankruptcy. 
 65. For this variable, as the numerical values for each category increase, 
housing becomes more unaffordable. In particular, affordable housing is coded 
as 0, unaffordable housing is coded as 1, and severely unaffordable housing is 
coded as 2. 
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was coded as a non-homeowner. Homeowners filed 74% of cas-
es. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Debtor Finances 
Model 
Note: * indicates amount in thousands of U.S. dollars. 
 
1. Regression Results 
There were 731 valid cases for the debtor finances model. 
The omitted cases were the result of missing data for any one 
or more of the variables. For example, a few debtors made only 
bare petition or “face sheet” filings and never filed schedules. 
Other debtors did not answer the survey question on homeown-
er status. Zeroes were not considered missing, but rather taken 
to be actual numbers. Some debtors simply did not owe any 
debts of a certain type; this was common with priority debt, for 
example, where the typical debtor did not have any debts enti-
tled to legal priority in repayment. 
Table 3 below shows the output from the logistic regression 
with random-effects on the judicial district variable. The de-
pendent variable was chapter 13 discharge, which codes all 
cases that were discharged as “1.” In addition to the coeffi-
cients66 from the regression analysis, Table 3 includes the pre-
 
 66. The coefficients represent the likelihood of chapter 13 completion (or 
chapter 13 discharge). For positive coefficients, an increase in the independent 
variable increases the likelihood of chapter 13 completion. A negative coeffi-
 Min Max Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Net Household  
Income* 0.444 19 3.06 3.46 1.97 
Unsecured Debt 
Amount* 0 289.18 23.44 35.67 41.55 
Priority Unsecured 
Debt Amount* 0 318.28 0 3.38 15.45 
Secured Debt 
Amount* 0 887.48 91.68 119.66 126.93 
Unaffordable Housing 0 2 0 0.358 0.59 
Home Owner 0 1 1 0.736 0.44 
  
1050 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1031 
 
dicted probabilities of chapter 13 discharge for each variable. It 
also includes two predicted probabilities for each variable, each 
of which are calculated holding all other variables in the model 
at their mean. The first predicted probability for each variable 
is calculated by subtracting the standard deviation67 from the 
mean, and the second probability for each variable is calculated 
by adding the standard deviation to the mean.68 Calculating the 
predicted probabilities for variables at the interval of one 
standard deviation from the mean in both directions, and then 
calculating the difference between these probabilities allows us 
to compare the relative relationships of variables to chapter 13 
completion. 
The variable with the largest difference in predicted prob-
abilities has the most influence on chapter 13 completion. 
Therefore, out of all the variables included in the debtor financ-
es model, we found that Unsecured Debt Amount has the larg-
est effect in predicting chapter 13 completion (difference=0.35), 
followed by priority debt (difference=0.25), secured debt (differ-
ence=0.18), and affordability of housing (difference=0.15). 
 
cient indicates an increase in the independent variable decreases the likeli-
hood of chapter 13 completion. For example, Unsecured Debt Amount has a 
positive coefficient, which is interpreted as indicating that increases in the 
amount of unsecured debt increases the likelihood of chapter 13 completion. 
On the other hand, Unaffordable Housing has a negative coefficient, meaning 
the more unaffordable housing becomes (or as the unaffordable housing varia-
ble increases) the likelihood of chapter 13 completion decreases. 
 67. The standard deviation of a variable is a measure of dispersion from 
the mean. It is the average (mean) of the spread between each observation and 
the average observation (mean). 
 68. For instance, looking at Table 2, we find that net household income 
has a mean of 3.46 and a standard deviation of 1.96. The first predicted proba-
bility for net household income was calculated by holding all other variables in 
the model equal to their mean and net household income equal to 1.49 (which 
equals the mean-standard deviation (“sd”)), and the second predicted probabil-
ity was calculated holding all other variables in the model equal to their mean 
and net household income equal to 5.43 (which is the mean+sd). The predicted 
probabilities were calculated for each variable in this way. 
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Table 3: Debtor Finances Model 
 Coefficients 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean-sd) 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean+sd) 
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Net  
Household 
Income 
0.05 
(0.06) 
 
0.39 0.43 0.04 
Unsecured 
Debt 
Amount 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.27 0.59 0.32 
Priority Debt 
Amount 
-0.04* 
(0.01) 
 
0.44 0.30 -0.14 
Secured 
Debt 
Amount 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
 
0.50 0.33 -0.17 
Unaffordable 
Housing 
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
 
0.46 0.34 -0.12 
Homeowner 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
0.44 0.40 -0.04 
Constant -0.35    
Log  
Likelihood -445.46    
Notes:  1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of dis-
charge for each variable, plus and minus the standard deviation, 
holding all other variables in the model constant at their mean. 
 2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
2. Interpretation of Findings 
The debtor finances model strikes us as most interesting 
for the variables that are not significant: income and homeown-
ership. The debt variables have the anticipated associations. 
Higher unsecured debts are related to greater likelihood of 
discharge. The value of a discharge comes in relation to general 
unsecured or priority unsecured debts. The more unsecured 
debt that a family has, the greater benefit a discharge will 
bring in its financial problems. When there is little or no unse-
cured debt, a chapter 13 case may be successfully resolved 
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without a discharge—at least as theoretical matter.69 We inter-
pret the correlation between unsecured debt and discharge as 
some indication that the anticipated economic incentives creat-
ed by the legal system to shape real-world outcomes. People 
who derive the most relief from completing a chapter 13 plan 
are significantly more likely to do so. 
Another explanation may exist for why those with large 
unsecured debts fare better in chapter 13. General unsecured 
debts are required to be paid only if the debtor has disposable 
income, and often debtors have little or no such income availa-
ble. Thus, families achieve real savings inside bankruptcy from 
eliminating or reducing monthly minimum payments to unse-
cured creditors. In turn, this frees up money in the family’s 
budget to make payments to secured creditors—a requirement 
for completing a plan. 
Higher general unsecured debts also do not burden a debt-
or’s path to chapter 13 success because of bankruptcy law’s re-
quirement that a debtor only make payments on unsecured 
debt if he or she has “disposable” income (income remaining af-
ter reasonably necessary expenses).70 For many debtors, there 
is no such disposable income, and a “repayment” plan may ac-
tually propose to pay zero to unsecured creditors. Thus, regard-
less of the dollars of debt, the repayment requirement may 
evaporate if a debtor needs all her income to meet expenses. 
Having a higher amount of secured debt at bankruptcy is 
related to a lower likelihood of discharge (p<0.05). At first 
blush, this finding may be surprising. The primary motivation 
for most chapter 13 filings, as reported by debtors, is trying to 
save their homes.71 Not surprisingly, mortgage debt is the bulk 
of secured debt for 74% of the sample who are homeowners. To 
be sure, chapter 13 has tools to address difficulty in paying se-
cured debts. For home mortgages, the main tool is the right to 
cure a delinquency on a home mortgage by spreading the re-
payment of the arrears over many months or years. For other 
secured debts, such as automobile loans, the debtor may be able 
to reduce the secured debt to the value of the collateral. 
 
 69. See Porter, supra note 5, at 149–52 (discussing the challenge that 
chapter 13 households face in achieving their goals without a discharge be-
cause most dismissed cases result in the immediate resumption of debt collec-
tion activities). 
 70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012). 
 71. Porter, supra note 5, at 135–36. 
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The available research suggests that these tools, however 
remarkable they may strike a non-bankruptcy specialist, are 
simply too weak to rehabilitate debtors.72 The lien or mortgage 
remains attached to the collateral in bankruptcy,73 meaning 
that if debtors cannot make the monthly payments due, the 
creditor can repossess and foreclose. When the car or home is 
expensive, vis-a-vis a debtor’s income and other expenses, the 
debtor may simply be unable to make the loan payments. When 
a debtor misses one or more payment, a creditor will file a mo-
tion for the bankruptcy court’s permission to repossess or fore-
close on the collateral. At that point—realizing that a creditor 
will soon take ownership of their cars, homes, or other assets, 
many debtors give up on bankruptcy entirely. They cease to 
make any payments at all under the plan—even those that do 
not relate to the collateral asset. The result is that the debtor’s 
bankruptcy ends, with the trustee to then file a motion to dis-
miss the case. Prior research using interviews with debtors 
whose cases did not achieve a discharge documented this pat-
tern.74 What appears on the court docket as a dismissal for the 
debtor’s failure to make chapter 13 plan payments (distributed 
to unsecured creditors) is actually driven by a debtor’s refusal 
to continue with bankruptcy when the ongoing secured loan 
cannot be paid and the car, house, or asset will be forfeited to 
the lender. 
We tested this idea further by constructing and including a 
variable that assessed housing costs as a fraction of a debtor’s 
income. Renters, like homeowners, face eviction, despite being 
in chapter 13, if they do not make their ongoing monthly obli-
gations. Housing cost is a better measure of the way in which a 
family’s shelter obligations may influence chapter 13 comple-
tion than a binary look at homeownership. As the regression 
shows, homeownership itself is not statistically significant. 
 
 72. Id. at 112–13. 
 73. Mortgage liens may be eliminated in bankruptcy in a few situations. 
Least commonly—but most cleanly—if a lien would be invalid against a hypo-
thetical bona fide purchaser of the property or a hypothetical judgment credi-
tor, then the lien is invalid. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2012). Junior mortgage liens that 
are wholly unsecured (that is, the collateral value is less than the senior lien) 
may be eliminated with appropriate language and completion of the debtor’s 
chapter 13 plan. Some courts require a discharge, rather than simply plan 
completion, but all require the completion of plan payments as a prerequisite 
to strip off a wholly unsecured mortgage lien. 
 74. See Porter, supra note 5.  
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Some people who file chapter 13 own their homes outright with 
no mortgage, and others are deeply underwater with multiple 
liens. A binary homeownership variable masks the tremendous-
ly different financial consequences of homeownership between 
those who have no mortgage, modest mortgages, and expensive 
mortgages. 
Housing cost burdens, which can be calculated for both 
renters and homeowners, are a measure of the available frac-
tion of income taken for housing. Because most people are una-
ble or reluctant to move quickly, these housing cost burdens 
limit the flexibility to deal with unexpected peaks in expenses 
or troughs in income. The added burden of a chapter 13 plan 
payment as a fixed expense only increases the dollars that are 
earmarked in a family’s budget and so unavailable to meet var-
ying expenses. 
Prior research has demonstrated the high housing cost 
burdens of chapter 13 debtors. In a study of chapter 13 debtors 
who filed in 2005, Eggum, Porter, and Twomey reported that 
71% of cases had unaffordable or severely unaffordable home-
ownership costs.75 That sample was limited to homeowners liv-
ing in states that permit non-judicial foreclosure.76 The sample 
used here is national and includes renters and homeowners. 
Our analysis found that 30% of cases were filed by households 
burdened with unaffordable or severely unaffordable housing. 
This is actually slightly lower than the national rate; in 2015, 
the “share of cost-burdened households . . . [was] 34.1 per-
cent.”77 
Our results find that as housing becomes more unafforda-
ble, the likelihood of chapter 13 completion decreases. People in 
bankruptcy who must meet rent, mortgage, and utility pay-
ments have little ability to shoulder the additional burdens of 
chapter 13 with regard to plan payments. Because of the dire 
and rapid consequences of a default on rent, mortgage, or utili-
ty payments, this is a difficult expense to defer in order to meet 
chapter 13 plan payment deadlines. Faced either with case 
dismissal or eviction/foreclosure/utility shut-off, people often let 
the chapter 13 case end. Even in cases in which the plan pay-
ment to unsecured creditors is zero, an unaffordable housing 
 
 75. Eggum et al., supra note 28, at 1142. 
 76. Id. at 1133. 
 77. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD. OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NA-
TION’S HOUSING 2015, at 30 (2015) (defining “cost-burdened” as households 
paying in excess of 30% of income for housing). 
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burden means that making regular mortgage payments is a big 
stretch. If saving a home was the primary goal of the chapter 
13 bankruptcy, then either missed mortgage payments or 
missed trustee payments may doom the case. When a debtor 
fails to make required plan payments, the case will be dis-
missed without a discharge. 
Income is an important predictor of many phenomena. Yet, 
in chapter 13, the absolute amount of income is largely irrele-
vant as debtors are required to commit all excess “disposable 
income” to their repayment plans.78 Having a higher income 
does not require larger plan payments if a debtor’s expenses 
are correspondingly larger. Bankruptcy law effectively imposes 
a 100% “tax” on any additional income that exceeds expenses in 
chapter 13. The models did not estimate any independent effect 
of income amount in predicting plan completion. 
A positive interpretation of this finding is that it suggests 
that chapter 13 bankruptcy works about equally well for lower-
income people as for higher-income people. In a legal system in 
which income inequality drives many results,79 bankruptcy is 
notable as a counterexample. While all debtors must have some 
amount of regular income to qualify for chapter 13, the esti-
mates suggest that even those with a modest amount of income 
can achieve a discharge. 
B. DEBTOR DEMOGRAPHIC MODEL 
Across many areas, the outcomes of a social or legal pro-
cess are associated with demographic characteristics of its us-
ers. This dynamic is particularly apparent in the criminal jus-
tice context; it is well established, for example, that young, 
black and Latino males involved in the criminal justice system 
have historically received longer sentences than comparably 
situated white males.80 Further, in some jurisdictions and in 
 
 78. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012). 
 79. See DEBORAH RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004) (providing a book-
length treatment of Rhode’s argument); Deborah Rhode, Whatever Happened 
to Access to Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 869, 882 (2009) (“Unrealistic income 
eligibility ceilings, typically set at 125 percent of the poverty line, . . . exclude 
many individuals who cannot realistically afford counsel. As a consequence, 
millions of Americans lack access to the legal system.” (citations omitted)). 
 80. TUSHAR KANSAL, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY IN 
SENTENCING: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 7 (2005); see also Cassia Spohn & 
David Holleran, The Imprisonment Penalty Paid by Young, Unemployed Black 
and Hispanic Male Offenders, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 281, 299–301 (2000) (extend-
ing a previous study conducted in Pennsylvania, and concluding that in addi-
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the federal system, “minority defendants [are] more likely to 
receive a death sentence than white defendants.”81 The theory 
of the debtor demographic model is that households in bank-
ruptcy would follow the same basic trends: better outcomes 
(here, more likelihood of discharge) for people who are better 
educated, non-minority race, married, and working in higher 
social status jobs. 
While repeated studies have shown that people in bank-
ruptcy are demographically similar to a broadly defined middle 
class of Americans,82 that “middle class” finding does not mean 
there is not variance in demographic characteristics. Our data 
set is big enough to allow us to measure whether social and 
personal qualities, rather than financial characteristics (Debtor 
Finances Model), of individuals are associated with success in 
chapter 13. The CBP data gather over two dozen demographic 
characteristics for each filer, none of which are collected by the 
Official Bankruptcy Forms. Testing this model using our data 
can give insights that are not available to the most researchers, 
who are limited to administrative data. 
This debtor demographic theory is particularly important 
to test because of recent research showing that race is perhaps 
the single best predictor of whether a person files chapter 13 
instead of chapter 7.83 Blacks are twice as likely to file chapter 
13, even when controlling for homeownership and other legal, 
geographic, and socioeconomic factors.84 This groundbreaking 
 
tion to Pennsylvania, young black and Hispanic males are more likely than 
middle-aged white offenders to be sentenced to prison in Chicago, Miami, and 
Kansas City); Gene Demby, Study Reveals Worse Outcomes for Black and La-
tino Defendants, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/codeswitch/2014/07/17/332075947/study-reveals-worse-outcomes-for 
-black-and-latino-defendants (reporting the findings of the Vera Institute for 
Justice, which examined more than 2,220,000 Manhattan cases over a two-
year period and found that “race still played ‘a statistically significant inde-
pendent factor’ in how a given case was handled at almost every stage”). 
 81. KANSAL, supra note 80, at 14; see also Richard R.W. Brooks & Steven 
Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
609, 610 (2002) (“Our analysis also reveals a consistent pattern of harsher out-
comes correlated with the race of the defendant.”). 
 82. Elizabeth Warren & Deborah Thorne, A Vulnerable Middle Class: 
Bankruptcy and Class Status, in BROKE, supra note 50, at 25, 25–26. 
 83. See Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy 
Chapter Choice, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393, 393 (2012) (“Even after con-
trolling for financial, demographic, and legal factors . . . African Americans are 
much more likely to file chapter 13, as compared to debtors of other races.”). 
 84. Dov Cohen & Robert M. Lawless, Less Forgiven: Race and Chapter 13 
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finding is a powerful reminder that although the written law 
may be race-neutral, the system may not function that way. We 
were interested in whether other demographic qualities, such 
as age, also were associated with the likelihood of discharge. 
Here again, our model is based on research. The proportion of 
older Americans, particularly those in their seventies and old-
er, in increasing sharply.85 Our analysis looks at whether they 
fare differently after seeking debt relief. 
1. Predictor Variables 
Each of the variables comes from the 2007 CBP’s written 
survey.86 These variables were collected for each person, mean-
ing that there are data for two people in dual-headed house-
holds.87 To illustrate, if a case was filed by a forty-five-year-old 
man with a high school degree and a thirty-year-old woman 
with a college degree, the household was assigned an age of for-
ty-five years and an education level of college degree. While 
there are certainly other valid approaches, none of our testing 
suggested a difference in results. As a matter of theory, we 
think a household has the benefit and burdens of the person 
with the “most” of a particular quality (that is, if only one per-
son has a college degree, the household still has that benefit 
over a household with two lesser-educated people). 
a) Marital Status: The survey allowed participants to re-
veal their marital status in some detail, such as by indicating 
widowed, single (never married), divorced, etc. We made the 
variable dichotomous, reflecting whether an adult who was 
currently married filed the bankruptcy or not. A case filed by a 
married person was coded as a “1.” Of the cases, 51% had a 
married person as a debtor.88 
 
Bankruptcy, in BROKE 176, 181 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012). 
 85. John A.E. Pottow, The Rise in Elder Bankruptcy Filings and Failure 
of U.S. Bankruptcy Law, 19 ELDER L.J. 119, 120 (2011); see also Deborah 
Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability 
of Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 87, 88 (2009) (“The average age for filing bankruptcy has increased, and 
the rate of bankruptcy fillings among those ages sixty-five and older has more 
than doubled since 1991.”). 
 86. Lawless et al., Bankruptcy Reform, supra note 35, at 391. 
 87. The survey asked for information on both adults living in a household, 
regardless of whether the bankruptcy filing itself was made jointly or only one 
adult in a married couple had filed. 
 88. Bankruptcy petitions may be either single or joint, the latter being an 
option only for married couples. But a married person may file a single peti-
tion. This variable is drawn from the survey, which asked the debtor to report 
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b) Household Age: This continuous variable reflected the 
age of the oldest filer (or their non-filing spouse in a non-joint 
case filed by a married couple). 
c) Household Education: This ordinal variable allowed re-
spondents to indicate the highest education they had obtained, 
with a “0” being no high school diploma/no GED, and “7” being 
a doctorate or professional degree. The two largest categories 
were 23.5% selected high school graduate or GED and 24% se-
lected one or more years of college but no college degree. Only 
one in five households had one or more adults with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher.89 
d) Household Occupational Prestige: Occupational prestige 
is an “indication of one’s ability to demand and receive defer-
ence and opportunities . . . .”90 Successive surveys over decades 
measure the status that people associate with particular occu-
pations. For example, a hair stylist has a prestige score of 33; a 
physician has a score of 84.91 Income and education are corre-
lated, but there are exceptions.92 
e) Self-Employment: Unlike age, education, and occupa-
tional prestige, we categorized a household as being self-
employed if either of the adults reported being self-employed. 
This decision reflects two conclusions. First, as a theoretical 
matter, we think a household with even one self-employed per-
son has some characteristics that distinguish it from a house-
hold with two traditional wage earners. For example, self-
employed people bear more responsibility for tax withholding, 
may have more experience with borrowing, and may have less 
stable total household income due to fluctuations in the self-
employed person’s work. Second, there were not enough house-
holds with two self-employed people to merit a separate catego-
ry. Among all cases, 21% had one or two self-employed adults. 
In this dichotomous variable “1” reflects self employment. 
f) Race (black): The survey asked respondents if they were 
a member of one or more racial or ethnic groups. Information 
 
current marital status. So regardless of whether the case was single or joint, 
the data reflect the case composition—half of all cases are filed by one or more 
married adults. 
 89. The education variable is coded as follows: (0) Some education, no di-
ploma/GED; (1) High school graduate or GED equivalent; (2) Some college 
credit but no degree; (3) One or more years of college, but no degree; (4) Asso-
ciate’s Degree; (5) Bachelor’s degree; (6) Master’s Degree; (7) Doctorate. 
 90. Warren & Thorne, supra note 82, at 252 n.19. 
 91. Id. at 31 (providing examples of occupational prestige scores). 
 92. Id. 
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also was reported on the other person for two-adult households. 
Respondents could check all race/ethnicity categories that ap-
plied. Consistent with the empirical research discussed above,93 
and after testing other approaches, we chose a binary measure 
at the household level. If either one or both adults in the 
household self-reported being African American/black, then the 
household was coded as a “1” for black.94 
e) Minor Dependents: This variable measures the number 
of minor dependents in a household under eighteen years of 
age. Just over half (53%) of all households had children. Fewer 
than 4% of households had four or more dependents. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Debtor Demographic 
Model 
 Min Max Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Married (1=married) 0 1 1 0.53 0.50 
Household Age 21 85 46 46.40 11.49 
Race (1=black) 0 1 0 0.34 0.47 
Household Education 0 7 3 2.92 1.67 
Household Self-Employed 0 1 0 0.22 0.41 
Occupational Prestige 12 76 42 41.51 10.58 
Number of Minor  
Dependents 
0 8 1 1.10 1.29 
 
2. Regression Results 
There were 640 valid cases for the demographic model. 
Cases were dropped when one or more variables was missing. 
We had to drop a number of cases in which the debtor indicated 
“other” as education, as that response could not be included 
when we were treating the educational variable as ordinal. On 
the CBP survey, respondents could skip any question. Dropping 
 
 93. Braucher et al., supra note 83 (showing that black debtors, but not 
other ethnic and racial groups, are disproportionately represented in chapter 
13 bankruptcy). 
 94. Very little is known about how those who identify as Hispanic or 
Asian (or other ethnic or racial populations) fare in bankruptcy. Generally, 
surveys have reported rates of bankruptcy of Hispanic Americans and Asian 
Americans that are disproportionately lower than their presence in the gen-
eral population. Porter, supra note 5, at 129–30 nn.125–27. 
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all cases in which one or more variables had missing data re-
sulted in a loss of 118 cases. 
Table 5 presents the results from the logistic regression. 
Random effects were used to control for the effect of judicial 
district. As with the first model, the dependent variable was 
the case ending in a chapter 13 discharge as the positive out-
come (“1”). The table shows that in this model race plays the 
biggest indicator on chapter 13 completion, followed by the 
number of minor dependents. In fact, blacks are 17% less likely 
to complete chapter 13 over their non-black counterparts. 
Table 5: Debtor Demographic Model 
 Coefficients 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean-sd) 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean+sd) 
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Married 
(1=married) 
 
0.22 
(0.18) 
0.40 0.42 0.02 
Household 
Age 
 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.41 0.40 -0.01 
Race 
(1=black) 
 
-1.10*** 
(0.20) 
0.48 0.31 -0.17 
Household 
Education 
 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.38 0.43 0.05 
Self-
Employed 
 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
0.42 0.38 -0.05 
Occupational 
Prestige 
 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
0.41 0.40 -0.01 
Number  
of Minor  
Dependents 
 
-0.23** 
(0.08) 
0.47 0.33 -0.14 
Constant -0.06    
Log  
Likelihood -405.48    
Notes:  1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of dis-
charge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation hold-
ing all other variables in the model constant at their mean. 
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 2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
3. Interpretation of Findings 
In general, the model produced estimates in the expected 
direction. That is, the independent variables were more or less 
likely to predict discharge in a way that aligned with hypothe-
ses. Married couples and households with one or more relative-
ly well-educated people were more likely to complete chapter 13 
with a discharge. These are consistent with the idea that edu-
cation and two adults who can contribute to the household are 
financially beneficial. Prior research has also found that joint 
filings, which are always married people, are more likely to 
complete a plan.95 Married people may file without their spous-
es, however, and our demographic data allow for a more nu-
anced look at the effect than relying on the administrative data 
of joint or single filings. Our findings from a national sample 
are consistent with the single-district (Utah) study that found 
marital status was positively related to plan completion.96 
Households with an older adult and with self-employed 
workers were both less likely to discharge their debts after 
making payments in bankruptcy. Research from the 2007 CBP 
has discussed the financial challenges facing older Americans 
and the self-employed,97 as both groups are overrepresented in 
bankruptcy. They also fare worse in bankruptcy when they do 
seek help in chapter 13. 
While marriage, education, age, and self-employment have 
the expected direction of effect on bankruptcy success, none of 
these four variables were statistically significant. We think our 
findings confirm the general validity of our sample and analy-
sis but we do not rely on marriage, education, age or self-
employment in our final model as we cannot be reliably certain 
that such predictive effects are not the result of chance. 
Two demographic factors were predictive of discharge in 
chapter 13 and statistically significant: households with one or 
more black adults or households having minor children are 
 
 95. Norberg & Velkey, supra note 3, at 510. 
 96. Evans & Lown, supra note 8, at 213. 
 97. Robert M. Lawless, Striking out on Their Own, the Self-Employed in 
Bankruptcy, in BROKE, supra note 50 at 101, 103 (noting that the self-
employed in bankruptcy are usually in an even deeper financial hole than oth-
er filers); Pottow, supra note 85, at 144 (finding that elder bankruptcy filers 
typically have even lower monthly incomes than younger filers). 
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both less likely to finish chapter 13. These findings are trou-
bling because both racial minorities and those with children are 
particularly vulnerable to other economic and social risks, such 
as facing discrimination in finding housing or securing jobs, de-
spite laws to the contrary.98 
Households with one or more adults that select black as 
part of their racial identities are much more likely to fail to 
complete chapter 13. This finding gives real bite to the prior re-
search showing that blacks are much more likely to be in chap-
ter 13 than chapter 7.99 While those scholars have noted that 
chapter 13 is generally more expensive, slower, and more bur-
densome than chapter 7,100 our data show that blacks also are 
less likely to get a discharge in chapter 13 than filers with no 
black adults in the household. As an empirical matter, not just 
a theoretical one, blacks do not get the debt relief from bank-
ruptcy that non-blacks enjoy. 
We caution that correlation is not causation. While we are 
confident in the association between being black and not com-
pleting chapter 13, our data cannot explain the reason for that 
outcome. Several possibilities occur to us based on our 
knowledge of the scholarship and the functioning of the bank-
ruptcy system. First, since previous research shows that blacks 
are being disproportionately steered into chapter 13,101 it may 
be that there are a disproportionate number of blacks in chap-
ter 13 who are steered into it even when it is not suited to their 
financial profile. Further, if blacks are more likely to be coun-
seled to file chapter 13 than non-blacks, they may have less in-
terest or commitment to chapter 13 of their own accord. With 
less independent interest or desire for chapter 13 (outside of 
their attorney’s accord), blacks may be less willing to endure 
the long repayment plan. This is a rational reaction that could 
reflect a slow realization that a non-bankruptcy or chapter 7 
bankruptcy solution would be better, despite their attorney’s 
counseling at the time of filing. Second, blacks may encounter 
discrimination during the chapter 13 process. No data exist 
that permit an analysis of whether trustees’ or judges’ decisions 
about chapter 13 may differ by race, controlling for relevant 
factors. There may be no such effect, but the Bankruptcy Rules 
 
 98. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2015); Equal Opportunity 
Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 99. Braucher et al., supra note 83. 
 100. Cohen & Lawless, supra note 84, at 176. 
 101. Braucher et al., supra note 83. 
  
2017] CRACKING THE CODE 1063 
 
Committee’s refusal to add racial self-identification to the 
bankruptcy forms makes it impossible to examine the issue.102 
Finally, blacks may be more likely to have qualities associated 
with not completing chapter 13 that we cannot identify because 
of data limitations. As an example, our data cannot measure 
the risk of chronic disease, but such medical problems could 
cause greater income interruptions that hinder chapter 13 
completion. 
Children are expensive, as the perennial graphics in news-
papers illustrate.103 Indeed, it is not surprising that the more 
children debtors have, the less likely they are to successfully 
complete their chapter 13 plan. More children means more 
clothes and shoes to buy, more food to provide, greater trans-
portation costs—the list goes on and on. But chapter 13 plans 
are supposed to take into account these additional expenses by 
allowing a debtor to deduct expenses for dependents, such as 
day care and additional food allowances.104 
What chapter 13 plans do not take into account, however, 
is the increased risk of financial shock that each additional 
child adds to one’s life. Financial shocks are usually considered 
unexpected events that result in a loss of income or expenditure 
paid.105 Elizabeth Warren’s research has pointed to the excep-
tional risk for a bankruptcy filing for families with children.106 
 
 102. E-mail from Judge Elizabeth Perris, U.S. Bankr. Court Dist. of Or., to 
Katherine Porter, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law (Jan. 13, 
2011, 13:41 PST) (on file with author) (stating that the “kind[ ] of data collect-
ed . . . is limited by judicial policy to what is needed for case administration 
and what is required by law” and that collecting racial identification would 
require a change to judiciary policy). 
 103. Josh Zumbrun, Coming Soon: Millennials Married with Children, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/coming-soon 
-millennials-married-with-children-1439371801. 
 104. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (2012). 
 105. See Signe-Mary McKernan & Caroline Ratcliffe, Events That Trigger 
Poverty Entries and Exits, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 1146, 1146 (2005) (examining “how 
[trigger] events—such as changes in household composition, employment sta-
tus, disability status, and economic conditions—affect poverty entries and ex-
its”); see also Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping into and out of Pov-
erty: The Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 2 (1986) (referring to 
these shocks as “disturbances”); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety 
Net: A Study of Earned Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Re-
pair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 528 n.52 (2013) (recording as a shock event “any 
event that [survey] respondents described as initially unanticipated and po-
tentially damaging to [their] economic well-being”). 
 106. Elizabeth Warren, Bankrupt Children, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1003, 1006 
(2002) (“By every measure, these data show that families with children are 
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As she noted, “Children do not file for bankruptcy, but the story 
of bankruptcy is a story about children.”107 Our finding supports 
that her conclusion applies to how families fare in bankruptcy, 
not just to risk of bankruptcy filing. 
Debtors with children may start out able to make their 
monthly plan payment, but with each additional child, there is 
an increased risk of an unexpected event that wipes out the 
money needed to make plan payments. For example, if a child 
experiences an unexpected medical problem, the debtor would 
have to pay for any expenses not covered by insurance, copay-
ments, medical equipment and so on. Additionally, depending 
on how severe the medical condition is, the debtor may have to 
take off from work and lose income for those days, or even 
worse, lose his or her job if there are too many absences (or late 
arrivals) due to the medical condition. As this example illus-
trates, shocks of one type can spiral into a cascade of other 
shocks, each resulting in a loss of income (or an expenditure).108 
For debtors paying into chapter 13 plans, a cushion to account 
for this type of expense is usually unavailable, since any dis-
posable (after court-approved expenses) income is going to-
wards plan payments.109 As previous research has shown, fami-
lies who experience financial shocks often rely on credit cards 
to stay afloat during the fall-out from shocks.110 For chapter 13 
debtors, credit cards are likely to be unavailable or only offer a 
 
disproportionately at risk for bankruptcy when compared with their childless 
counterparts.”). 
 107. Id. at 1004. 
 108. For further details about how one shock can result in a cascade of oth-
er negative and expensive events, see id. 
 109. Some districts do permit a cushion in debtors’ budgets, while others do 
not. This is a frequently proffered example of local legal culture. While chapter 
13 provides that “all” of a debtor’s disposable income is to be paid to creditors, 
11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (2012), some courts accept a cushion or reserve fund 
for emergencies as a legitimate “reasonably necessary” expense that may be 
deducted from disposable income. See, e.g., In re Belt, 106 B.R. 553, 563 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (“[A] reasonable reserve or contingency fund in the 
debtor’s budget would not violate 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) and is properly a 
part of the disposable income analysis.”); In re Fries, 68 B.R. 676, 683 n.7 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (permitting a contingency fund of $92.16 per month for 
a family of four with two young children). But see In re LaSota, 351 B.R. 56, 60 
(Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2006) (denying savings to build a bank account for the fu-
ture, observing that while “[p]ursuit of a growing bank account is certainly 
more highly recommended than pursuit of a finer house or car, . . . it is still 
‘discretionary’”). We discuss the idea of how chapter 13 might accommodate 
income and expense instability further in Part IV, infra. 
 110. Greene, supra note 105, at 552–57. 
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couple hundred dollars of credit.111 This leaves people in bank-
ruptcy without a resource available to nonbankrupt families to 
cope with the unexpected expenses that children often create. 
These findings add to the longstanding research of Eliza-
beth Warren and others that describes the typical bankruptcy 
debtor as a white, middle-aged, person, with some college and 
other indicia of middle class membership.112 Our regression 
analysis shows that two demographic characteristics—being 
black and having minor dependents—significantly change the 
odds a chapter 13 bankruptcy filing will be successful. The law 
may be race-neutral and believe that it makes appropriate al-
lowances for dependents; however, our findings suggest that 
changes may be needed to level the playing field across demo-
graphic groups. 
C. SYSTEM PROCESS MODEL 
In a prior study of chapter 13 completions, Jean Braucher 
compared plan completion rates in different judicial districts.113 
She used regression analysis to examine whether variations on 
district practice could be supplementing the attitudinal differ-
ences of debtors’ attorneys, judges, and trustees that she identi-
fied in a seminal piece on local legal culture.114 Her thesis was 
that procedural or operational differences were a key mecha-
nism for expressing local legal culture, and themselves rein-
 
 111. People in chapter 13 bankruptcy can use credit cards, but there are 
several reasons why this is uncommon. First, as a consequence of the filing, 
the issuer will normally cancel any credit card listed as a debt in the bank-
ruptcy. Second, chapter 13 debtors must obtain the permission of the chapter 
13 trustee to take on any new debt during their repayment plans. This per-
mission adds a major procedural step for debtors, and trustees vary in their 
willingness to grant such requests. Third, cards that are available are likely to 
be either secured cards (in which the borrower puts cash on deposit with the 
lender as collateral for repayment) or to be capped at very low amounts. Addi-
tionally, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 
2009 sharply limited default fees and imposed other requirements to discour-
age issuers from giving cards to people who are likely to have problems mak-
ing payment. Because chapter 13 debtors are supposed to be devoting all ex-
cess income to repayment, they are not able to demonstrate their ability to 
repay additional new debts. 
 112. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, 
supra note 3. 
 113. Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankrupt-
cy: Impact on Chapter 13 Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 557, 
558 (2001). 
 114. Id. at 577–79. 
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force the belief culture of a particular district.115 These systems 
decisions—often driven by a particular judge’s or trustee’s pref-
erences, or historical practices—are viewed as inevitable, non-
malleable qualities of chapter 13. “Everyone” in the bankruptcy 
world knows that if you file in District X that certain processes 
will be used.116 
Consider three illustrative examples. The Central District 
of California has a rate of pro se filings that is many multiples 
of the national average.117 This has endured for decades, despite 
lamentations.118 Filers without an attorney face severe hard-
ships in navigating chapter 13 bankruptcy.119 This varies by 
district, which we address in the regression with a random ef-
fects control, but even within a district, the judges and trustees 
have more or less tolerance for filers without an attorney. Some 
are quick to dismiss these cases, believing they are essentially 
doomed to failure; others have extensive programs to assist 
these filers. The self-help desk, the online chat, and electronic 
self-representation software are examples of innovations in the 
Central District of California to ease the burdens on people 
without attorneys.120 There is no similar program in other areas 
in the judicial district. 
As another example, there are judges who vehemently op-
pose wage orders, which are a voluntary deduction of the plan 
payment from the employer, on the grounds that they brush too 
close to the Thirteenth Amendment or are paternalistic.121 Oth-
 
 115. Id. at 559. 
 116. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankrupt-
cy Courts, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 875, 891–92 (2015) (describing judges’ practices, 
including standing orders and informal, yet known, requirements that create 
variation in chapter 13 hearings). 
 117. US BANKR. COURT CENT. DIST. OF CAL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE: SELF-
REPRESENTED PARTIES AND THE COURT 2013 (2013), http://www.cacb.uscourts 
.gov/sites/cacb/files/documents/publications/ProSe%20Annual%20Report% 
202013.pdf [hereinafter ACCESS TO JUSTICE]. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Littwin, supra note 50, at 158. 
 120. ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 117, at 19–22. 
 121. See Randolph, supra note 16 (“Some experts disagree that automatic 
payments should be mandatory. In the late 1930s, when Congress debated the 
wage-earned plans precursor to chapter 13 bankruptcy, one bankruptcy offi-
cial in the Northern District of Illinois objected to the court’s exercise of con-
trol over debtors’ income. Today, at least one judicial district prohibits manda-
tory wage orders. Others doubt that mandatory automatic payments teach 
debtors to pay their bills on time because it facilitates their reliance on some-
one else (the trustee) to submit payments for them.”); see also In re Aberegg, 
1990 WL 92429 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. June 15, 1990) (denying trustee’s request 
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er trustees or judges impose them nearly automatically; a debt-
or must actually inquire or object to learn that a wage order is 
not actually required by the Bankruptcy Code. A leading chap-
ter 13 treatise advises that “Debtors’ attorneys can enhance the 
likelihood of success of their clients’ cases and, incidentally, en-
hance the likelihood of payment of attorneys’ fees by insisting 
upon income deduction orders at the filing of every Chapter 13 
case.”122 
Finally, several trustees believe that making mortgage 
payments through the plan (called “conduit pay” because the 
trustee serves as an intermediary to transmit the homeowner’s 
mortgage payment to the mortgage servicer) is beneficial to 
plan completion. Despite educational efforts, many trustees re-
fuse to shoulder this burden.123 Some cite the need to change 
procedures and educate local practitioners, while others note 
that it can, in some cases, increase costs of plan administration 
at least initially.124 
The system process model looks at how cases are adminis-
tered to see if these approaches are related to plan completion. 
We hypothesized that factors that reduce debtor discretion and 
increase expert involvement in the case would increase plan 
completion. These variables are wage orders, paying the mort-
gage through the plan, and attorney representation. Converse-
ly, we expected that those in longer plans or with more refilings 
would be less likely to complete plans. The longer the plan, the 
more opportunity for missed payments that result in case dis-
missal. Those with refilings have a prior history of plan failure 
 
that chapter 13 debtors be forced to submit payment using a wage order be-
cause doing so would potentially bring chapter 123 into conflict with the Thir-
teenth Amendment); cf. In re Leask, 194 B.R. 416, 418 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996) 
(rejecting argument that a wage deduction order in a chapter 13 case would 
violate the prohibition in the Texas Constitution on wage garnishment). 
 122. Keith M. Lundin & William H. Brown, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, 4TH 
EDITION, § 248.1, ¶ 8, Sec. Rev. June 8, 2004, www.Ch13online.net; see also 
Randolph, supra note 16 (stating that data “indicate a strong correlation be-
tween automatic payment rules and plan completion rates”). 
 123. Doreen Solomon & Martha Hallowell, Chapter 13 Trustees Weigh Ad-
vantages and Disadvantages of Paying Debtors’ Ongoing Mortgages,  NACTT 
Q., Apr./May/June 2009, reprinted in Bankruptcy Articles, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/bankruptcy-articles#2009 (download PDF) (“If a 
trustee chooses not to handle ongoing mortgage payments, the U.S. Trustee 
will support that decision. . . . We understand that managing these mortgages 
will require more resources . . . .”). 
 124. Gordon Bermant & Jean Braucher, Making Post-Petition Mortgage 
Payments Inside Chapter 13 Plans: Facts, Law, Policy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
261, 261–62 (2006). 
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that we expected would repeat; this intuition is supported by 
prior studies.125 Some trustees that we interviewed for this pro-
ject, however, believed that there was a “learning curve” to 
chapter 13 and stated that in their districts prior filers were 
more likely to complete.126 We sought to test this hypothesis 
with a large, national sample and regression techniques. 
1. Predictor Variables 
Most of the variables come from the 2007 CBP’s written 
survey. Two of these variables—wage order and mortgage paid 
through the plan—were not coded by the 2007 CBP, and we 
went back to each of hundreds of case files to discern the rele-
vant data. In some instances, the use of these procedures could 
not be discerned. 
a) Length of Plan: This ordinal variable represents length 
in months of each filer’s chapter 13 plan. The variable is coded 
as “0” for those with a plan of 36 months or less, “1” for those 
with a plan more than 36 months but less than 60 months, and 
“2” for those with a 60-month plan. In our sample, more than 
half of the sample (approximately 62%) had 60-month plans. 
b) Number of Prior Bankruptcies: For each filer, we coded 
this variable as “0” for individuals with no prior bankruptcies, 
“1” for individuals with one prior bankruptcy, or “2” for indi-
viduals with 2 or more bankruptcies. Approximately 69% of the 
sample had no prior bankruptcies and 20% had one prior bank-
ruptcy. 
c) Attorney Represented: This is a dichotomous variable 
that is coded “1” for filers with attorney representation. In the 
sample 96% had attorney representation. 
d) Mortgage Payment Plan: We, the authors of this Article, 
added this variable to the 2007 CBP data for the purposes of 
this study. We determined whether, for each debtor with ongo-
ing mortgage payments, whether the debtor was making these 
payments directly or the payments were “conduit,” paid by the 
trustee out of the overall contribution of the debtor to repay-
ment. This variable is a dichotomous variable coded as “1” for 
 
 125. Norberg, supra note 8, at 449. 
 126. E-mail from Debra Miller, Chapter 13 Trustee, N. Dist. of Ind., to 
Katherine Porter, Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal. Irvine Sch. of Law (Sept. 11, 
2015, 11:28 PST) (on file with author) (“I think that a prior chapter 13 that 
dismissed is generally a good indicator that the second filed chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy will be more likely to complete and be successful. . . . Some trustees call 
the first case a starter bankruptcy.”). 
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filers that have their mortgages paid through a plan. In the 
sample, 57% of cases had mortgages paid through the plan by 
the trustee. 
e) Wage Order: This is a binary variable representing 
whether a wage order was entered in the case. In unconfirmed 
cases, this was coded as a no. About one-third (34%) of cases 
had a wage order used to collect the plan payment. 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for System Process Model 
 Min Max Median Mean Standard Deviation 
Length of Plan 0 2 2 1.39 0.84 
Number of Prior 
Bankruptcies 0 2 0 0.42 0.68 
Attorney Representation 0 1 1 0.98 0.15 
Mortgage Payment Plan 0 1 1 0.59 0.49 
Wage Order 0 1 0 0.35 0.48 
2. Regression Results 
Compared to the other three models, the system process 
model is smaller in two senses. The number of observations is 
682 cases. The largest number of cases (eighty-nine) was 
dropped because the length of the plan was not observed in the 
records. The model also contains fewer independent variables—
only five. Nonetheless, as Table 7 reports, we find some surpris-
ing results. Many of the most “cultural” aspects of bankruptcy 
practice—reflecting the choices and preferences of the local 
chapter 13 trustee and the small cadre of judges—do not seem 
to influence chapter 13 outcomes. The model estimation also af-
firms the prior research on repeat filers and pro se filers. Both 
groups fare poorly relative to first-time bankruptcy debtors and 
those who have attorney representation. 
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Table 7: System Process Model 
 Coefficients 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean-sd) 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean+sd) 
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Length of 
Plan 
 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
0.40 0.35 -0.05 
Number of 
Prior Bank-
ruptcies 
 
-0.66*** 
(0.13) 
0.44 0.27 -0.17 
Attorney 
Representa-
tion 
 
2.27* 
(1.05) 
0.30 0.39 0.09 
Mortgage 
Payment 
Plan 
 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
0.38 0.36 0.02 
Wage Order 
 
0.29 
(0.19) 
0.35 0.40 0.05 
Constant -2.24    
Log  
Likelihood -445.42    
Notes: 1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of dis-
charge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation hold-
ing all other variables in the model constant at their mean. 
 2) *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
3. Interpretation of Findings 
Local legal culture is the theory that even when the formal 
law is the same or similar across locations, perceptions, expec-
tations, and beliefs can change the reality of law.127 The postu-
lation was that local legal culture transcends individual experi-
ences, endures over a long period of time, and is a shared set of 
beliefs in the anthropological sense of the term “culture.”128 In 
 
 
 127. Sullivan, Warren, & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 804 (defining local 
legal culture as “systematic and persistent variations in local legal practices as 
a consequence of a complex of perceptions and expectations shared by many 
practitioners and officials in a particular locality, and differing in identifiable 
ways from the practices, perceptions, and expectations existing in other locali-
ties subject to the same or a similar formal legal regime.”). 
 128. Id. at 803. 
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their seminal piece, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued 
that “local legal culture exercises a pervasive, systematic influ-
ence on the operation of the federal bankruptcy system,” and 
pointed to variations in chapter 13 as an example of such ef-
fects.129 They argued that in bankruptcy, context, as much as 
the Bankruptcy Code, created legal experiences, and they prof-
fered quantitative and qualitative data to support the role of 
local legal culture.130 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook argued that future re-
search should be sensitive to local legal culture, and that anal-
ysis of the bare law was insufficient.131 They warned that even 
empirical studies of the bankruptcy system might “miss the 
underlying reality” or be “incomplete” if the studies did not or 
could not include indicators of local effects.132 Their powerful 
conclusion called for an end to the “anonymity of local legal cul-
tures” and a new approach to assessing law:  
Local legal culture is not just dust in the national legal machine. In 
fact, it may be a significant element of the legal landscape. Failure to 
account for it causes policy debates as well as legal reforms to fall 
wide of their marks. It is surely time to accelerate our study of such 
cultures and to begin to piece together a systematic view of their in-
fluence on the legal system.133 
Simultaneously to Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook, oth-
ers were articulating similar concerns. Jean Braucher inter-
viewed dozens of attorneys, finding significantly different ap-
proaches in counseling debtors on the appropriateness of 
chapter 13.134 Gary Neustadter observed lawyers’ intake and 
counseling sessions and found significant differences in the 
structure and content of their questions and their answers to 
clients.135 Decades later, Melissa Jacoby reports on an extreme 
variation of delegation techniques used by judges with respect 
to chapter 13 plan confirmation.136 Local legal culture took its 
 
 129. Id. at 806. 
 130. Id. at 853 (“The narratives suggest and the data support the conclu-
sion that the differences may coalesce into a force that has a measurable im-
pact on debtor decisionmaking.”). 
 131. Id. at 861. 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 865. 
 134. Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many 
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 502–03 (1993). 
 135. Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and Client Meet: Observations of In-
terviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law Office, 
35 BUFF. L. REV. 177, 178 (1986). 
 136. See Jacoby, supra note 116, at 876–77 (contrasting judges who hand 
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place alongside the statutes in the Bankruptcy Code, the Colli-
ers’ treatise, and published case law as a guidepost for what 
bankruptcy really “is.” 
Even as empirical studies have become larger and increas-
ingly sophisticated, local legal culture persists as the response 
to findings that are counter to one’s beliefs, experiences, or per-
ceptions. The exemplar of the explanatory interaction between 
data and local legal culture is the debate about discharge rates 
in chapter 13. As one of us has written, “[t]he hard fact is that 
every single study of the consumer bankruptcy system has con-
cluded that repayment bankruptcies fail” to end in discharge.137 
The response points to the widespread variation in districts as 
evidence that chapter 13 can work.138 One need only look under 
the correct rock to find the answer.139 Actors in the bankruptcy 
system report that “their district,” “their cases,” or “their court” 
are different than the data in a study of chapter 13 outcomes, 
inviting the researcher to study the differences (i.e., the better 
way of doing things) used in their local area.140 
In chapter 13, local legal culture has become the residual 
explanation for the extreme variation in practice.141 When the 
efficacy of a local process is questioned, the default justification 
is that one could not change it—even with a better approach—
because local legal culture is so enduring and powerful. This 
point was raised repeatedly in the recent rulemaking effort to 
create a national form for a chapter 13 plan. Actors from vari-
ous districts asserted that “their” system was not broken, and 
so the use of a national form should not be mandated.142 Under 
pressure from those with a national perspective who found the 
variation in plans to be problematic, some critics compromised, 
 
over their courtrooms to chapter 13 trustees to conduct plan confirmation 
hearings with judges who impose additional hurdles on chapter 13 beyond the 
statutory confirmation requirements). 
 137. Porter, supra note 5, at 155. 
 138. Id. at 117; Whitford, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
 139. Whitford, supra note 15, at 13 (acknowledging the “extreme variance 
in Chapter 13 practice . . . which came to be called ‘local legal culture’”). 
 140. Porter, supra note 5, at 153. 
 141. See Whitford, supra note 15, at 13 (“Chapter 13 practices can vary 
considerably even within a single judicial district.”). 
 142. Meeting Minutes of Advisory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Pro-
cedure, Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, Apr. 20, 2015, http://www 
.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee 
-rules-bankruptcy-procedure-may-2015. In the wake of disagreement, the Ad-
visory Committee on Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure decided to delay imple-
menting a model form for a plan. Its future remains uncertain. 
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allowing that those districts that wanted to adopt the model 
plan should be permitted to do so.143 The defeat of a national 
model chapter 13 plan is consistent with an embrace of local le-
gal culture. 
Many of the administrative variables in this model are ex-
actly the administrative practice differences that judges, trus-
tees, and attorneys turn to when they claim that their district 
is different—they are doing things right, unlike the rest of the 
country.144 These factors, indeed, are where local legal culture is 
most salient. Judges and trustees may perceive that these ad-
ministrative choices are beneficial,145 but hard data do not sup-
port that they boost chapter 13 completion. Our model shows 
that these administrative variations do not correlate with suc-
cess for debtors, contradicting conventional wisdom.146 This is 
not to suggest that such goals are not valid. Trustees and judg-
es may prefer wage orders, for example, because they minimize 
late payments. Also, mortgage payments through the plan may 
assist debtors in ensuring that servicer records are reconciled 
at the end of the case with their payments during the plan. Our 
empirical findings, however, illustrate the need for robust eval-
uation of the efficacy of legal systems. People embedded in the 
system have many goals and factors that influence their beliefs. 
Our data collection and analysis serve as beneficial tools for 
challenging assumptions and distinguishing in policy debates 
between sound general approaches, and the specific practices 
that demonstrably increase plan completion. 
Additionally, the anecdotal belief among some bankruptcy 
professionals that a prior history of plan failure actually in-
creases success in the subsequent chapter bankruptcy is simi-
larly not supported by the data.147 Instead, the inverse is true—
 
 143. Marvin Isgur et al., Comments on Proposed National Chapter 13 Plan: 
A Diverse Group of Bankruptcy Professionals Propose a Compromise Solution, 
REGULATIONS.GOV (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.regulations.gov/document?D= 
USC-RULES-BK-2014-0001-0061 (download “Committee Submission Letter”) 
(proposing to allow districts to decide whether to adopt the national model 
form or create a local version of a model form). 
 144. See Randolph, supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 145. A. THOMAS SMALL & EUGENE R. WEDOFF, A PROPOSAL FOR MORE EF-
FECTIVE BANKRUPTCY REFORM 16 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
American Bankruptcy Institute) (arguing that wage orders and mortgage 
payments through the plan are the most effective way to help debtors com-
plete repayment, relying in part on their years of experience as bankruptcy 
judges). 
 146. Bermant & Braucher, supra note 124, at 277. 
 147. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126 (“That prior case makes the 
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with no prior bankruptcies, the likelihood of a discharge is 0.44. 
With one prior bankruptcy, this drops to 0.29, and with more 
than two prior bankruptcies, the likelihood of discharge is 0.17. 
This is consistent with research showing that the primary rea-
son most chapter 13 refilers had dropped out of bankruptcy the 
first time was because they experienced a financial shock that 
made payment plans impossible.148 People may file a later 
bankruptcy case because they had somewhat recovered from 
the prior shock and wanted to try again to get bankruptcy relief 
as a lasting solution to piled up debts.149 Our data suggest, 
however, that these people are high-risk cases. We cannot 
measure their attitudes, and perhaps the trustees are correct 
that these debtors are “more realistic.”150 The data show they 
still face exceptionally long odds compared to first-time filers—
who themselves have less than even odds of plan completion. 
One might postulate two interpretations of this connection 
between refilers, shocks, and plan failure. First, those who 
were most vulnerable to experiencing a shock during the first 
filing might be at higher risk for experiencing a shock during 
the second filing. Perhaps they have less financial stability in 
their lives overall compared to non-refilers. Or, it may be that 
this group of refilers is at no higher risk of a shock than first-
time filers, but since they did not have the resources to with-
stand the shock and continue making their chapter 13 pay-
ments the first time, they similarly are unable to do so when a 
shock hits again. They did not have a financial cushion the first 
time around, and they similarly did not have it for previous fil-
ings. There is not enough research about financial shocks and 
stability at this time to know which, if either, of these theories 
is correct, but they may help explain why refilers are at an in-
creased risk for plan failure. 
An area where scholars and professionals have long had 
common ground is concern about pro se filings.151 Those who 
 
debtors more likely to be successful in the second bankruptcy—they know 
what is expected and are willing to make changes to their lifestyles to make it 
happen. Because of that realistic attitude and commitment to changes, debtors 
filing their second bankruptcies are generally more likely to complete their 
chapter 13.”). 
 148. Sara Sternberg Greene, The Failed Reform: Congressional Crackdown 
on Repeat Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Refilers, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 241, 262–63 
(2015). 
 149. Id. 
 150. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126. 
 151. See NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N., supra note 121, at 235 (“[D]ebtors 
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have attorneys are much more likely to finish chapter 13. The 
predicted probability of getting a discharge is much greater 
with an attorney. Prior research pointed to this problem. For 
example, Angela Littwin, using an earlier version of the 2007 
CBP (before plan completion data was available) that we use in 
this Article, reported that pro se chapter 13 filers get their cas-
es dismissed quickly.152 Without an attorney to help them craft 
a plan that satisfies creditors and the trustee, such debtors face 
objections to plan confirmation and hearings before the court 
that they are ill equipped to navigate alone. While this finding 
is not surprising to us, the analysis is helpful to undergird ar-
guments that access to justice issues relate to actual justice 
achieved by consumers. As in nonbankruptcy legal settings, an 
effective reform needs to take into account the process-oriented 
factors that relate to plan completion, not just the substantive 
legal rules.153 Our analysis can help policymakers weigh the 
relative costs and benefits of interventions such as pro se clerks 
for bankruptcy courts or requiring attorney representation for 
chapter 13 filings. Our multi-factor model should advance the 
debate from naked lamentations about the difficulties present-
ed by pro se bankruptcy debtors. Both the refiling variable and 
the attorney variable suggest that chapter 13 may benefit from 
reforms that reduce its complexity and improve debtors’ abili-
ties to navigate the system to debt relief.154 
Of our models, the systems model best typifies the influ-
ence of local legal culture on the actual experience of chapter 13 
practice. This model should be the most fruitful. The results 
debunk the myth that a trustee’s or judge’s practices are hugely 
 
who end up in the complicated Chapter 13 system without good advice are un-
likely to be able to navigate their way through the process.”); Angela K. 
Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s Greatest 
Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1933, 1955–56 (2011); see also Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings 
Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief, AM. B. ASS’N (Dec. 29, 2011), https:// 
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se 
-bankruptcy-growing.html; CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT, CITY BAR JUSTICE 
CTR., http://www.citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/consumer-bankruptcy 
-project (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 152. Littwin, supra note 50, at 166 (reporting that in the 2007 Consumer 
Bankruptcy Project sample, 91.3% of chapter 13 pro se cases were dismissed 
before confirmation). 
 153. See generally D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal 
Assistance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 951–55 (2013) (discussing the need for fur-
ther research to determine best practices). 
 154. Porter, supra note 5, at 156 (“A simpler, redesigned system can articu-
late a crisp objective and build ways to test progress into the system itself.”). 
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influential in how debtors fare. Choices such as wage orders 
and paying through the plan may make the system more effi-
cient or less expensive or have other beneficial features, but we 
could not see that debtors succeed because of these practices. 
Our finding pushes back at Jean Braucher’s seminal study that 
asserted wage orders were a significant predictor of chapter 13 
completion.155 Because we use case-level data and random ef-
fects on judicial district, we believe that our analysis provides a 
more reliable and nuanced assessment of whether wage orders 
and conduit pay are the keys to chapter 13 success. Sadly for 
those looking for a quick fix for chapter 13—and one that does 
not require Congressional amendment to the Bankruptcy 
Code—procedural interventions will not remedy the concerns 
about case outcomes. 
We also note that the length of the repayment plan is not 
statistically significant. In many ways, this is a happy finding. 
On the one hand, unsecured creditors can rejoice that you can 
squeeze longer and therefore increase recoveries, without forc-
ing debtors out of repayment. On the other hand, from the 
debtor-focused perspective, policymakers and scholars raised 
grave concerns that the mandate of bankruptcy reforms 
(BAPCPA) that certain families have five-year plans156 would 
drive down chapter 13 success.157 This does not necessarily 
mean that longer plans are sound policy. We cannot measure 
the discouragement effect of five-year plans as our sample con-
tains only those who did file bankruptcy. 
More importantly for our question of interest, the immate-
riality of length of plan points toward the very problem with 
any plan that is at least three years of length. To have an influ-
ence on success, any reform would need to amend the Bank-
ruptcy Code to reduce the minimum repayment to fewer than 
three years. Put another way, because all plans must be be-
tween three and five years,158 we can only show that this differ-
ence in repayment does not seem to influence outcomes. We 
 
 155. Braucher, supra note 113, at 578–79. 
 156. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012) (imposing an “applicable commit-
ment period” for repayment plans in chapter 13 of five years if income exceeds 
the state median for a household of the same size as the debtor household). 
 157. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death of Consumer Bankruptcy in the Unit-
ed States?, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 25 (2001). 
 158. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A). The exceptions are if the debtor pays 100% 
of unsecured debts prior to three years of plan repayment, id. § 1325(c), or if 
the debtor obtains a hardship discharge under id. § 1328(b). 
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cannot opine on the effect on chapter 13 plans if repayment 
were of other lengths, such as one year or ten years. 
D. HOUSEHOLD SECURITY MODEL 
Prior CBP studies have provided substantial insights on 
debtors’ self-identified reasons for filing bankruptcy.159 These 
reasons are only obtainable from survey data, as bankruptcy 
law itself does not require the debtor to provide an explanation 
for the borrowing or repayment difficulties. The data on bank-
ruptcy reasons point to factors associated with household eco-
nomic security (such as job status and whether the debtor had 
health insurance) as frequent contributors to the financial dis-
tress that leads to bankruptcy. Each iteration of CBP data over 
the years found that shocks—from a job problem, a medical 
problem, or a change in family situation—were the leading 
causes of bankruptcy.160 
In this model, we examine whether the most common prob-
lems that precipitated bankruptcy in the first place continue to 
affect debtors’ abilities to successfully complete their chapter 13 
plans. The theory for why such a shock may continue to predict 
ability to successfully complete chapter 13 is best illustrated 
using an example. Consider a debtor who self-identifies that a 
medical problem is his reason for filing for bankruptcy, and 
that problem was cancer. One could imagine that the existence 
of the medical problem, in this case cancer, makes the debtor 
more susceptible to secondary shocks related to the cancer. 
This could take the form of a recurrence, which would cause 
further medical bills, more medical appointments—which re-
sult in loss of income—or a host of other factors. Or, the theory 
could be that for any given shock, once someone experiences 
such a shock and files for bankruptcy because of it, they are 
more likely both to experience a shock, and to be unable to 
weather the shock in the context of their financial reality 
(which would include payment plans once they file for chapter 
13 bankruptcy). Should this theory hold true, then attorneys 
would know to ask potential debtors about the reasons they 
 
 159. See generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY 
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 
(2000) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE 
CLASS]. 
 160. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME 
TRAP 81 (2003). 
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filed for bankruptcy and indeed could consider chapter choice 
based on these factors. 
Likewise, should other predictors of household stability 
(such as employment status, health insurance status, etc.) pre-
dict success in chapter 13, attorneys and debtors could consider 
these factors when evaluating chapter choice and make more 
informed decisions about a debtor’s ability to succeed based on 
his or her unique financial situation. Indeed, health insurance 
status, difficulty in making house payments, and other stability 
factors are apparent at the time of filing, so knowing their rela-
tionships to success in chapter 13 has the potential to profound-
ly inform chapter choice without additional effort on the part of 
the debtor or the attorney. 
1. Predictor Variables 
This model includes variables that examine why house-
holds filed for bankruptcy, and other household characteristics 
that may influence financial security. Most of these variables 
reflect the debtor’s self-reported reasons for filing bankruptcy 
or coping strategies used before bankruptcy. These variables 
were not available in prior studies, which relied solely on ad-
ministrative (non-survey) data.161 There are 768 observations in 
this model. 
a) Job Reason: This dichotomous variable represents 
whether bankruptcy was filed due to losing a job or decline in 
income, as self-reported in the survey. Approximately fifty-six 
percent of the sample filed due to loss of job or decline in in-
come. 
b) Medical Reason: This dichotomous variable represents 
whether bankruptcy was filed due to medical reasons. Forty 
four percent of the sample filed for medical reasons. 
c) Family Reason: This dichotomous variable represents 
whether bankruptcy was filed due to a change in family dynam-
ics, such as divorce, death in family, or birth of a child. Thirty-
one percent filed for bankruptcy due to a change in family dy-
namics. 
d) House Reason: This dichotomous variable represents 
whether bankruptcy was filed because filers couldn’t afford 
their house or mortgage. Fifty-six percent of the sample filed 
for this reason. 
 
 161. See supra note 8. 
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e) Spending Reason: A dichotomous variable that 
measures whether bankruptcy was filed due to problems con-
trolling spending. Twenty-six percent of the sample filed for 
this reason. 
f) Help Others Reason: A dichotomous variable that 
measures whether a reason for the debtors’ financial problems 
that preceded bankruptcy was helping others financially. Nine-
teen percent of the sample filed for this reason. 
g) Health Insurance: This variable measures the health 
insurance status of everyone in the household. Zero is coded for 
households where no one has health insurance. One is coded for 
households where only some have health insurance and two is 
coded for households where everyone is insured. 
h) Family/Friends Borrow: This dichotomous variable 
measures whether filers borrowed money from family or friends 
two years before filing bankruptcy. Sixty-six percent of the 
sample borrowed money two years prior to filing. 
i) Working Household: This dichotomous variable 
measures whether individuals in the household are working. 
Approximately seventy-eight percent of the sample has one 
person in the household who is working. 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Household Security 
Model 
 Min Max Median Mean Standard  Deviation 
Job Reason 0 1 1 0.56 0.50 
Medical Reason 0 1 0 0.44 0.50 
Family Reason 0 1 0 0.31 0.46 
House Reason 0 1 1 0.56 0.50 
Spending Reason 0 1 0 0.26 0.44 
Help Others Reason 0 1 0 0.19 0.39 
Health Insurance 0 2 2 1.58 0.70 
Family/Friends Borrow 0 1 1 0.66 0.47 
Working Household 0 1 1 0.78 0.42 
 
2 Regression Results 
There were 768 observations in this model. As in the first 
three models, a case observation was dropped from the sample 
for analysis when one variable or more was missing. Table 9 
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presents the results from the logistic regression. Also con-
sistent with the first three models, random effects were used to 
control for the effect of judicial district and the dependent vari-
able was the case ending in a chapter 13 discharge as the posi-
tive outcome (“1”). 
When we compare the differences in the predicted probabil-
ities to determine the influence each variable has on chapter 13 
completion, we see that the variable with the largest difference 
has the most influence on chapter 13 completion. Therefore, out 
of all the variables included in the household security model, 
we find that house affordability (House Reason) has the largest 
effect in predicting chapter 13 completion (difference = 0.23), 
followed by whether someone in the household was working 
(Working Household) (difference = 0.15), and finally the health 
insurance status (Health Insurance) of everyone in the house-
hold (difference = 0.13). 
Table 9: Household Security Model 
 Coefficients 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean-sd) 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean+sd) 
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Job Reason 0.12 
(0.17) 
 
0.34 0.37 0.03 
Medical 
Reason 
-0.16 
(0.17) 
 
0.37 0.34 -0.03 
Family  
Reason 
-0.24 
(0.18) 
 
0.37 0.32 0.05 
House  
Reason 
-0.97*** 
(0.17) 
 
0.47 0.26 -0.21 
Spending  
Reason 
0.28 
(0.19) 
 
0.34 0.38 0.04 
Help Others 
Reason 
-0.11 
(0.22) 
 
0.36 0.34 -0.02 
Health  
Insurance 
0.39** 
(0.13) 
 
0.29 0.42 0.13 
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Family/ 
Friends  
Borrow 
-0.31+ 
(0.18) 
0.39 0.33 -0.06 
 
Working 
Household 
0.71** 
(0.22) 
0.29 0.39 0.10 
     
Constant -1.01    
Log  
Likelihood -462.72    
Notes:  1) Predicted probabilities represents the predicted probability of dis-
charge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation hold-
ing all other variables in the model constant at their mean. 
 2) +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 4) We also tried this same model but used job tenure (continuous var-
iable of years employed) instead of a working household dichotomous 
variable. There was no difference in statistical significance of any var-
iable from the model presented in Table 9. Job tenure was statistically 
significant in the estimation, with a positive sign, indicating that 
those households with longer job tenure were more likely to complete 
chapter 13 discharge (p<0.01). We included working household in the 
model instead of job tenure because of the need to drop observations 
when a debtor gave years for a status such as “unemployed,” “stu-
dent,” or “retired.” Years in these non-working situations does not 
measure the possible effect on household income stability in the same 
way as years of continued employment at a particular job. 
3. Interpretation of Findings 
At first glance, the results of this model may appear sur-
prising because the factors that most contribute to entrance in-
to bankruptcy (financial shock events such as job loss, a medi-
cal issue, or a change in family status), do not predict success in 
chapter 13.162 As discussed in the introduction to this model, it 
is easy to postulate that a household that experiences a shock 
before filing for bankruptcy would be less likely to succeed in 
chapter 13. Warren, Westbrook, and Sullivan were crusaders 
for empirical research to identify the factors most likely to 
 
 162. NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 234 (“Some commen-
tators suggest that debtors frequently encounter repeated financial difficul-
ties. . . . The same kinds of spotty employment or medical problems that 
caused debtors’ initial financial problems may reemerge, or new problems may 
appear.”). 
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cause bankruptcy,163 and indeed, much of the academic investi-
gation into consumer bankruptcy focuses on the front-end: who 
files and why? 
The important takeaway from this model is that the data 
show that the “why” of bankruptcy filing is not determinative of 
success in bankruptcy. Put another way, the household security 
model suggests that at least some of the most important factors 
in causing financial failure do not doom people to failing to ad-
dress their financial problems. 
Two examples illustrate the twists in the relationship be-
tween pre-bankruptcy problems and “in-bankruptcy” problems. 
For decades, the CBP data have shown that a job problem is 
the number one, self-identified cause of bankruptcy.164 When 
reduction or elimination of income leaves people unable to meet 
expenses and drives up debt, the result is bankruptcy. Chapter 
13, however, requires people to have steady income as an initial 
eligibility criterion.165 Those with the most severe job problems, 
such as long-term unemployment, thus are likely diverted to 
chapter 7 as a matter of law. Attorneys also may counsel fami-
lies with substantial income volatility, such as independent 
contractors or seasonal workers, to file chapter 7.166 Job prob-
lems that created debt are likely at least partially resolved by 
the time people file chapter 13 bankruptcy. This factor is not 
significant in our model. As a second, more abbreviated exam-
ple, consider family change or break-up. This variable, both in 
our data and in studies on reasons for bankruptcy, includes sit-
uations such as death of a spouse, divorce or separation, or the 
 
 163. See generally SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE 
CLASS, supra note 159; SULLIVAN, WARREN, & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE 
OUR DEBTORS, supra note 3. 
 164. See SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS, supra 
note 159, at 79, fig.3.1 (showing that 67.5% of bankruptcy debtors reported one 
or more job problems); see also id. at 105 (“[B]y every measure, the debtors in 
bankruptcy are there as a result of trouble at work.”). 
 165. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012) (“Only an individual with regular income . . . 
may be a debtor under chapter 13 of this title.”). 
 166. Some courts have interpreted “regular income,” id. § 109(e), quite 
broadly to include sources such as regular monthly support from a boyfriend, 
and most courts accept benefits payments as “regular income” if they have no 
termination date (such as long-term disability). Unemployment or severance, 
because of its temporary nature, may not satisfy the legal requirement for 
“regular income.” See, e.g., In re Loomis, 487 B.R. 296, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 
2013) (holding that a debtor who was no longer eligible to receive unemploy-
ment compensation, and whose girlfriend of eighteen months did not give him 
funds to pay his separate bills, was “not ‘an individual with regular income’” 
as that term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)). 
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birth of a child. While these events destabilize household in-
come and expenses, they are (relatively) discrete moments. Af-
ter a period of months or years, the household may have sharp-
ly reduced income, with spousal/child support not making up 
the cost of a separate household, for example, but the amount 
of income will be fairly fixed. People in financial distress be-
cause of a family change can follow the advice to wait until 
their financial situation has stopped declining before seeking 
bankruptcy help.167 With relatively stable income, these fami-
lies can assess whether they can make the years of payments in 
chapter 13. 
When the regression results are analyzed in the context of 
household security research, the data are consistent with that 
literature. Factors that curb a household’s ability to reallocate 
income or adjust expenses make it harder to complete chapter 
13. We suspect that bankruptcy debtors deploy a variety of 
strategies to find the cash to pay the trustee, similar to other 
households where money is tight.168 Similarly, a lack of income- 
or expense-smoothing tools, such as insurance, leaves a house-
hold more vulnerable to financial turbulence. The result is to 
destabilize the chapter 13 plan. “Bankruptcy does not insulate 
against subsequent disaster,”169 and families with less flexibil-
ity in budgets fall out of chapter 13 to cope. 
The biggest indicator of predicting chapter 13 success in 
this model is housing cost. Based on our data, a household that 
filed for bankruptcy because it could not afford its rent or mort-
gage payment has only a 26% likelihood of completing chapter 
13 successfully. The problem is not the absolute size of the 
housing payment; it is the amount of income that each month 
must be committed without exception to avoid risking eviction 
or foreclosure. Housing costs cannot be easily adjusted. One 
must locate new housing and actually move. The associated 
costs, such as rental deposits and moving expenses, require 
available cash that few families with debt problems have. Fam-
ilies literally bunker down in their existing housing—even 
when the house is, as Elizabeth Warren colorfully described, a 
 
 167. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, ALL YOUR WORTH: 
THE ULTIMATE LIFETIME MONEY PLAN 266 (2005) (“Bankruptcy helps the 
most if you wait until the crisis has passed before you file.”). 
 168. Laura M. Tach & Sara Sternberg Greene, Robbing Peter To Pay Paul: 
Economic and Cultural Explanations for How Lower-Income Families Manage 
Debt, 61 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 1, 10–16 (2014). 
 169. NAT’L. BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 121, at 234. 
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“cement life raft.”170 If housing costs are a fixed component that 
chews up more than 30% (or 50%) of a family’s income, the 
budget has limited flexibility. Faced with the choice between 
losing a place to live and paying the trustee, many families 
make their mortgage payments and short their creditors. How-
ever, these same families are unlikely to have been persuaded 
to file chapter 7, because a primary reason for filing for bank-
ruptcy may have been to try to save their home from foreclo-
sure. 
The second most influential factor in our household securi-
ty model was membership in the active labor force. The majori-
ty, or 78% of the sample, had at least one person working in the 
household. The remainder of the sample cases had income gen-
erated by retirement, benefits, or other usually fixed amounts. 
Working households were more likely to successfully complete 
chapter 13 than households without at least one adult in the 
labor market. Income from a job, of course, provides the means 
to make plan payments, but as illustrated in the Debtor Fi-
nances Model (Table 3) that examined financial characteristics, 
the amount of income itself does not appear to relate to chapter 
13 completion. The primary obstacle for nonworking house-
holds may be the inability of an adult to boost income as ex-
penses increase or to cope with temporary expenses. To make 
ends meet, lower-wage workers may add hours or shifts, take 
on seasonal employment, or look for a better paying position. 
Non-workers, such as people with a permanent disability or in-
firm from age, cannot boost their incomes. In fact, unless cost of 
living adjustments are adequate, their buying power may de-
cline in subsequent years, even as plan payments remain level. 
It would be an uphill battle to complete chapter 13 on a fixed 
income, especially those that are designed to be subsistence 
amounts such as public benefit programs. 
The next strongest influence on chapter 13 completion is 
health insurance. Households that have no health insurance 
(for any members of the household) are 29% less likely to suc-
cessfully complete chapter 13 than their insured counterparts. 
Insurance does not necessarily, on average, reduce health costs 
when premiums and out-of-pocket costs are considered.171 But 
 
 170. WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 160, at 137. 
 171. We confess that we have not examined the health finance literature to 
know the empirical answer for typical Americans. Our point is that the entire 
theory of insurance is built on the idea that the premiums, over time in the 
aggregate, are more than the actual costs. 
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inexorably, insurance smooths costs. Instead of no bills when 
all are healthy and nonabsorbent expenses when someone is ill, 
insurance allows families to stabilize their household budgets 
by paying a fixed premium and (relatively) modest copays. In-
surance protects against expense shock, which can jolt a family 
out of chapter 13. 
Ultimately, the household security model shows us that 
there are some important factors associated with household se-
curity that help predict success in chapter 13, but some of the 
most important factors that affected household security before 
filing do not ultimate predict stability and success once a debtor 
files for chapter 13. 
III.  PREDICTORS OF CHAPTER 13 SUCCESS   
The four models described above identify certain factors 
that are predictive of chapter 13 success. Each is built on a dif-
ferent theory of bankruptcy, hypothesizing respectively that 
what matters is debtor’s financial situations, their de-
mographics, the implementation of chapter 13 in their case, 
and their financial prospects/habits. In this Section, we esti-
mate a final model that brings together all statistically signifi-
cant factors in the prior separate models. These are the inde-
pendent variables, with chapter 13 discharge remaining as the 
dependent variable. The final model allows us to identify which 
independent variables retain their statistical significance when 
controlling for other variables that have measurable effect. 
Table 10 below shows the results from the final model. The 
negative findings are easiest to see. Only two variables no long-
er retain statistical significance at the 5% level: secured debt 
and borrowed money from family/friends to cope before bank-
ruptcy. As Table 10 indicates, secured debt is significant at the 
10% level, and we are reluctant given the novelty of our study 
to discard it as worthy of further study.172 
The right-hand column of Table 10 allows for a rank order-
ing of the variables having the most influence on chapter 13 
success. The bigger the difference in the two calculated predict-
ed probabilities, the larger the effect of that variable. Although 
 
 172. We are particularly cautious given that the cases in our sample were 
filed in 2007, when mortgage debt as a form of household leverage was at an 
all-time high. Although we think this cuts the other way, and makes it even 
more likely that secured debt is not a major predictor of chapter 13 comple-
tion, we also know that statistical significance is a test on a particular sample, 
and that “close can count.” 
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we have discussed the implications of each variable in the con-
text of its model, we reflect here on the relative magnitude of 
the significant factors on chapter 13 success. 
Discouragingly, but perhaps not surprisingly in light of 
continued evidence of racial issues in the United States, having 
one or more self-identified black people in a debtor household is 
a powerful predictor of bankruptcy failure (difference in pre-
dicted probabilities, 0.17). Holding equal other factors in the fi-
nal model, a black debtor is 17% less likely to receive a dis-
charge in chapter 13 than a non-black person.173 More than 
amount of debt, prior bankruptcies, trying to save a home from 
foreclosure, or having a job—all features that are imbedded in 
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code—race matters. 
The next largest differences in the predicted probabilities 
are unsecured debt amount (difference=0.19), house reason (dif-
ference=0.13) and working household (difference=0.10).174 Of 
the three-dozen variables studied, we find that these are the 
most predictive of chapter 13 success. A person who reports 
that trying to save a house from foreclosure was a reason for 
their seeking bankruptcy has a 29% chance of discharge. Mak-
ing identical assumptions about the factors in the full model, a 
person who filed bankruptcy for reasons other than saving a 
house has a much higher likelihood of success at 42%. Entering 
chapter 13 to save a house—precisely one of its vaunted bene-
fits compared to the chapter 7 liquidation alternative—
predisposes a debtor to not completing the plan and getting 
debt relief. 
 
 173. The 17% figure presents the difference in the predicted probability of a 
chapter 13 discharge for a black debtor with all other variables in the model 
held at the value of its mean minus its standard deviation and for a black 
debtor with each other variable in the model held at the value of its means 
plus its standard deviation. 
 174. For this analysis, the positive and negative signs on the “difference in 
predicted probabilities” are not relevant. The absolute values of the differences 
in predicted probabilities can be compared to each other to assess relative size. 
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Table 10: Full Model 
 Coefficients 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean-sd) 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
(mean+sd) 
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities 
Unsecured 
Debt 
0.11*** 
(0.002) 
 
0.27 0.46 0.19 
Priority Debt 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
 
0.37 0.30 -0.07 
Secured 
Debt 
-0.002+ 
(0.000) 
 
0.39 0.31 -0.08 
Unaffordable 
Housing 
-0.41* 
(0.17) 
 
0.39 0.29 -0.10 
Black 
-0.91*** 
(0.21) 
 
0.43 0.26 -0.17 
Number of 
Minor  
Dependents 
-0.19* 
(0.08) 
 
0.40 0.30 -0.10 
Number of 
Prior Bank-
ruptcies 
-0.30* 
(0.15) 
 
0.38 0.31 -0.07 
Attorney 
Representa-
tion 
2.20* 
(1.07) 
 
0.27 0.36 0.09 
House  
Reason 
-0.59** 
(0.20) 
 
0.42 0.29 -0.13 
Health  
Insurance 
-0.31* 
(0.14) 
 
0.31 0.40 0.09 
Family/ 
Friends  
Borrow 
-0.27 
(0.19) 
 
0.38 0.33 -0.05 
Working 
Household 
0.68** 
(0.25) 
0.28 0.38 0.10 
     
Constant 0.01    
Log  
Likelihood -397.43    
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Notes:  1) Predicted probabilities represent the predicted probability of dis-
charge for each variable plus and minus the standard deviation hold-
ing all other variables in the model constant at their mean. 
 2) +p<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
 3) Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
Figure 1 below is a visualization of our key findings. It il-
lustrates the difference in the probability of a debtor getting a 
chapter 13 bankruptcy discharge, holding other factors in the 
model at their central tendency point (mean (average) for con-
tinuous variables and median for categorical (dichotomous and 
ordinal) variables). The figure shows that, for many variables, 
there are marked changes in outcomes. For example, holding 
all other factors at their midpoint, a debtor who has an attor-
ney to help her navigate bankruptcy has a 36% chance of a dis-
charge. Without help—going at it alone—we estimate a 6% 
chance of debt relief for person of similar race, prior bankrupt-
cies, secured debts, housing costs, insurance, or employment 
status (all factors in model). 
Figure 1: 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the greater a household’s protection 
from expense or income shocks, the higher the probability of 
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discharge. Health insurance illustrates the effect; households 
in which all people have insurance have the highest relative 
rates of discharge (38% holding other variables at midpoint). 
Next, are households with some, but not all members, insured 
(31%). Households completely without insurance have the 
grimmest odds (25%). We see similar trends in how housing af-
fordability and working households relate to being able to meet 
the demands of chapter 13 repayment plans. 
The higher the amount of unsecured debt that a debtor 
owes at bankruptcy filing, the greater likelihood that the debtor 
completes the chapter 13 plan. This strikes us as a straightfor-
ward incentive effect. Debtors with large amounts of unsecured 
debt need a discharge to forgive the amount of debts that they 
cannot pay. If all plan payments are not made, there will not 
typically be a discharge.175 Unless the debtor gets to the end of 
the plan, making all required payments, the chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy has only allowed them to whittle away at debts using 
any disposable income—an outcome available without the addi-
tional costs and burdens of bankruptcy. To analogize, the dis-
charge is the “treatment” or “cure” for unmanageable unse-
cured debts, and those with more unsecured debts are more ill 
and in need of a remedy. To conclude that those most in need 
have better odds of getting help is not to conclude that chapter 
13 is the best option for these debtors. Chapter 7 cases nearly 
always end in a discharge, and it is typically received within 
four to six months of filing. While we avoid detouring into the 
longstanding debate about the relative merits of chapter 7 and 
chapter 13, we do think it is reassuring that the financially 
worst off in terms of debt have better chances of getting debt 
relief in chapter 13. 
Cutting the other direction in an evaluation of chapter 13 
is the variable measuring whether those who file to save their 
homes are successful. While a debtor can cure an arrearage on 
a mortgage without getting a discharge, prior research shows 
that plan completion is a sound proxy for saving homes as a 
general matter.176 The fact that those who enter chapter 13 in 
 
 175. Bankruptcy does permit a court to enter a hardship discharge before 
completion of plan payments or the repayment of all unsecured debts in full 
(the usual conditions for discharge). 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2012) (enumerating 
the three-factor test, stating that the court may grant discharge when a debtor 
cannot make payments because of circumstances for which the debtor cannot 
justly be held accountable). We believe hardship discharges are rare but we 
are not aware of any data. 
 176. Porter, supra note 5, at 141–42. 
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mortgage trouble are less likely to complete plan payments 
bodes badly for assessing chapter 13’s efficacy as a homesaving 
tool. This is a frustrating finding, given chapter 13’s promi-
nence in policy debates (if not in reality) as a foreclosure pre-
vention device.177 As we discuss below in the Implications Sec-
tion, the system may be able to better sort homeowners at the 
time of filing using other variables that we identify such as un-
affordable housing costs and whether the household has earned 
income from working adults. Further research could fruitfully 
examine some of the interaction effects between such variables. 
We also plan to repeat this study with cases filed in 2013 and 
2014 from the ongoing CBP to assess how alternatives to chap-
ter 13 for foreclosure prevention such as mortgage loan modifi-
cations may result in different findings. 
To us, the most notable fact about the full model is not the 
strength of a few influences, but the rather the absence of such. 
In the final model, every variable except one—borrowed money 
to cope before bankruptcy—retains statistical significance. 
Chapter 13 success may have been elusive precisely because 
there is no single lever to ratchet. With more than a dozen var-
iables influencing the likelihood of discharge, it is perhaps little 
wonder that numerous studies (and thousands of continuing le-
gal education programs) have failed to pin down why debtors 
and their attorneys chose chapter 13 over chapter 7.178 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS   
In place of stale debate based largely on anecdote, this  
Article offers an analysis that can guide reform of chapter 13. 
The findings from our statistical models reinforce the allega-
tions that chapter 13 is complex,179 but can also provide bound-
aries for debate. Until there are larger or newer studies that 
advance this analysis, policymakers should start debating the 
 
 177. For a careful assessment of whether chapter 13 is promoting sustain-
able homeownership, see generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and 
Homeownership Risk, 2007 ILL. L. REV. 323 (2007). 
 178. SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, 
supra note 3, at 230–70; Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, Laws, Models, and Real People: Choice of Chapter in Person-
al Bankruptcy, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 661, 703–04 (1988) (diagraming the 
numerous variables and reflecting that the image demonstrates how complex 
the relationship among the factors is); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra 
note 10, at 815–16; Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code: An Economic Analysis, 63 IND. L.J. 1, 50 (1987). 
 179. Porter, supra note 5, at 104. 
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variables that we document as particularly useful as determi-
nants of discharge. 
A. REFORM WITHOUT REVOLUTION 
Empirical studies of chapter 13 have often led to calls for 
dramatic reform, including the complete repeal of chapter 13.180 
Our analysis points to a number of modest interventions that 
may go a long way towards improvement, including non-
statutory changes. Indeed, there are multiple determinants of 
chapter 13 completion. Even if our analysis were widely accept-
ed (and proved perfectly predictive in the future), it is unlikely 
that any single reform in chapter 13 would materially improve 
outcomes. This analysis shows that there is no panacea, but ra-
ther a number of possibilities for improving chapter 13. We 
highlight here both some strategies and some substantive re-
forms. 
At the most obvious level, attorneys could use our findings 
to guide discussions with clients about anticipated outcomes. 
Some consumers, if they knew the odds of completion with 
more precision, may weigh chapter 7 more favorably. In an era 
of personalized medicine and individual training, law can start 
using data to provide information that is more tailored to each 
client. While consumers will still bring optimism bias to the 
bankruptcy decision, personalization can help people counter 
such cognitive traits. Our findings are tools that lawyers could 
use to improve client advice.181 
 
 180. See William C. Whitford, Has the Time Come To Repeal Chapter 13?, 
65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989); see also Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay 
Lawrence Westbrook, What We Really Said About Chapter Thirteen, 5 NAT’L 
ASS’N OF CHAPTER 13 TR. Q. 18 (1992) (acknowledging that their initial find-
ings on chapter 13 in their book, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, led some to 
believe the authors thought chapter 13 should be eliminated as an option for 
debtors). 
 181. See Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors To Make Their Own 
Informed Choices—A Question of Professional Responsibility, 165 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L. REV. 165, 183 (1997) (“Even if a client ultimately decides to file in 
chapter 13 with an unrealistically tight budget in order to make a final at-
tempt at keeping certain property such as a home, making a realistic budget 
first will ensure that the client goes forward with her eyes open, understand-
ing the likelihood of failure. Moreover, she may save herself a significant 
amount of wasted effort and stress if the process of drawing up a realistic 
budget makes her realize that saving the home is not feasible and should not 
be attempted.”). 
  
1092 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [101:1031 
 
Bankruptcy law has always required that a plan be feasi-
ble for confirmation;182 the court must assess whether “the 
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to 
comply with the plan.”183 Despite this requirement, less than 
half of confirmed plans succeed.184 The odds of success are equal 
to a coin flip, not a ruling on the merits based on evidence. The 
experts even give outright contrary advice in some cases, such 
as that a prior filing makes a successive bankruptcy more likely 
to result in a discharge.185 We conclude that the feasibility 
standard seems to be either underused or woefully inaccurate 
in application.186 
Our model also identifies some predictors of chapter 13 
success that could be added to the law or practice to improve 
outcomes. For example, given the importance unaffordable 
housing, this ratio could be calculated on the bankruptcy forms 
and made salient. Judges interpreting the “regular income” 
standard may take a more strict interpretation that favors 
earned income187 if they recognized the poor outcome for non-
working debtors. We also strongly recommend that the bank-
ruptcy forms collect self-reported race data. Without such in-
formation, the disparate racial effects that we identify for 
blacks will undoubtedly go unaddressed. Any efforts to equalize 
outcomes for blacks and non-blacks would be complex,188 but 
 
 182. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2012) (mandating that courts will confirm 
plans where, in addition to other requirements, “the debtor will be able to 
make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Some plans are dismissed prior to a confirmation hearing. These addi-
tional cases are what drive the plan completion rate to between 33% and 40%. 
 185. E-mail from Debra Miller, supra note 126. 
 186. Feasibility in chapter 13 is usually interpreted to mean “not impossi-
ble” rather than “more likely than not.” The case law focuses on whether there 
is an obvious circumstance visible at the time of plan confirmation that would 
make completion unusually arduous. See, e.g., In re Fantasia, 211 B.R. 420 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1997) (finding that the feasibility requirement was not satis-
fied when debtors offered no evidence that they could make a large balloon 
payment due on their mortgage); In re Deutsch, 529 B.R. 308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2015) (ruling that the proposed plan was not feasible because it relied on vol-
untary contributions of debtor’s recent boyfriend and mother to make up the 
shortfall between debtor’s expenses and income); In re Eckert, 485 B.R. 77, 85 
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2013) (“Generally, visionary or speculative Chapter 13 plans 
will not meet the feasibility standard.”); In re Compton, 88 B.R. 166, 167 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that proposed plan that required debtor to 
obtain job after expiration of unemployment benefits reduced the uncertainty 
that the debtor would fail to repay). 
 187. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012). 
 188. Braucher et al., supra note 83 (discussing the implications of their 
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without the data and government responsibility for assessing 
the situation, the façade continues that bankruptcy is race neu-
tral.189 
Other reforms could be stronger. The Bankruptcy Code 
could be amended to require attorney representation as a con-
dition for chapter 13 eligibility. Such a requirement would sort 
those without attorneys into chapter 7, or more problematical-
ly, deny them bankruptcy relief. While we are emphatically not 
recommending that action, at least not without careful consid-
eration of alternatives and a robust debate, our analysis is 
pointed in its conclusion. We cannot close an eye to the plight of 
pro se filers in chapter 13. Even if pro se filers are prevalent in 
only a few districts, our data support the need for reforms in 
those locations. We believe that technology may offer ways to 
improve the resources available to pro se parties,190 and that 
longstanding interventions in other courts, such as dedicated 
pro se clerks, would ease debtors’ plights.191 
The major implication of this Article is that we can learn 
more about chapter 13, and then debate how to deploy that 
knowledge. We do not think our findings, taken alone, support 
the repeal of chapter 13. While this was debated in the wake of 
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook’s initial findings on chapter 
13 outcomes,192 we seek here to explain chapter 13. Eliminating 
it out of hand would be a sweeping form and require more 
study and validation. That stated, we are firm in our opinion 
that these findings make it inexcusable to leave chapter 13 
alone under the guise that local practice is the determining fac-
tor in chapter 13 outcomes. Our analysis shows that many of 
 
findings on attorney influence on chapter choice based on race). 
 189. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1725, 1726 (2004). Indeed, when presented with a request to add race 
as even an optional item to the bankruptcy forms, a member of the Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure replied that race could not 
be included because the forms were limited to gathering information that was 
relevant to the just administration of bankruptcy cases. E-mail from Judge 
Elizabeth Perris, supra note 102. 
 190. Ronald W. Staudt & Marc Lauritsen, Introduction, Justice, Lawyering 
and Legal Education in the Digital Age, 88 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687 (2012) (de-
scribing contents of symposium volume that has several pieces considering 
how technology can ease access to justice concerns). 
 191. Who Does What: Court Legal Staff, FED. JUDICIAL CENT., http://www 
.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?openagent&nav=menu5b&page=/federal/ 
courts.nsf/page/355?opendocument (last visited Nov. 30, 2016) (describing the 
routine use of pro se clerks in federal district court). 
 192. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
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the factors that vary locally and have been deemed “the” im-
portant determinant of chapter 13 outcomes do not, in fact, 
predict success. 
B. DISRUPTION BY DATA 
One of the goals of this Article is to disrupt the idea that 
chapter 13 is impenetrably local and inexplicably varied, and 
that therefore it cannot be improved on a national level. We 
want to loosen the grip of the misinterpretation of local legal 
culture theory on the debate about consumer bankruptcy re-
form, in renewing what we believe is the crucial question: can 
chapter 13 law and practice be adjusted to boost its efficacy to a 
level (admittedly undetermined at present) high enough to jus-
tify the complexities created by the law’s two-chapter approach 
to consumer bankruptcy?193 
Our findings can outline the next set of questions. The fac-
tors that we identify as influential can guide the construction of 
new research and even the limitations of our study can prompt 
replication with additional variables or alternate methodolo-
gies.194 Our data should disrupt the idea of local legal culture. 
In some ways, our call is back to the future where Sullivan, 
Warren, and Westbrook began. Their scholarly works on chap-
ter 13 filing rates dislodged the idea that all bankruptcy varia-
tion could be explained by the rational choices of debtors acting 
with full information of their situations and the process ahead. 
Indeed, we think this project is a return to the core ap-
proach of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook. With a random na-
tional sample and stronger statistical software, we can produce 
an analysis of chapter 13 that eluded them. Researchers can 
repeat or expand our analysis, using new samples and adding 
statistical tools.195 If the findings are robust and consistent, this 
 
 193. Cf. Whitford, supra note 180, at 88 (“The argument for repealing 
Chapter 13 rests on the assumption that it is not practical to alter existing 
bankruptcy practice so that most consumers make an informed and self-
interested choice between Chapters 7 and 13.”). 
 194. For example, a prominent practitioner and past president of the Na-
tional Association of Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys, Ed Boltz, suggested 
that further study should add in the variation in chapter 13 trustee compensa-
tion as an important additional cost that can burden a debtor trying to com-
plete a plan. Telephone Interview by Katherine Porter with Edward C. Boltz, 
Partner, The Law Offices of John T. Orcutt, P.C., (June 5, 2015). 
 195. Indeed, we intend to reproduce this study using data from debtors who 
filed for chapter 13 in 2013. Additionally, we know almost nothing about chap-
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Article will have provided a powerful push for reform in the di-
rections that are most likely to prove successful. 
Inspiring legal reform is difficult. Beyond the problems of 
political economy, the actors themselves may resist reforms. 
Judges, trustees, clerks of courts, and others may resist change, 
as illustrated by efforts to soften BAPCPA and retain prior 
practices.196 In a specialized system such as bankruptcy, the ex-
pert and repeat players—the judges, the attorneys, and the 
trustees—are gatekeepers to reform. The difficulty has been 
persuading them to move in a single direction when they be-
lieved the chapter 13 world defied rational or systemic study. 
As a result, the dialogue about chapter 13 is undisciplined. The 
debate diverges into proclamations that “I know success when I 
see it,” and “chapter 13 works pretty well when I use it.”197 The 
effect can become regional, with people resisting reforms that 
would change practice in their courts. In a sleight of hand, the 
policymaker is directed to “look under a different rock,”198 while 
being reassured that all is well in a given area. 
This approach to chapter 13 is not limited to geography. 
We ourselves have studied single factors that affect chapter 13, 
respectively refiling (Greene)199 and unaffordable mortgages 
(Porter),200 without looking at the larger picture. When a reform 
is attempted, the defense is that there is insufficient evidence 
that everybody will be better, on average or as a whole, with 
changes to practices. People offer up their own local legal cul-
ture as evidence that their approach is superior, at least for 
their location. Instead of a debate about whether a reform is 
desirable or practicable, the discussion devolves into finger 
 
ter 7 debtors who do not receive a discharge. While that percentage is small, 
some of the same factors may be predictive of bankruptcy success. 
 196. Greene, supra note 148, at 256 (describing how judges interpret a 
Bankruptcy Code provision intended to curb repeat filings as not requiring a 
hearing, despite the explicit language of the statute, in order to avoid impos-
ing expense on debtors and administrative burdens on courts). 
 197. See Nancy B. Clark, From the President, CDCBAA NEWSL. (Cent. 
Dist. Consumer Bankr. Att’y Ass’n), Sept. 2015, at 1, 2 (“I do not view Chapter 
13 as a ‘government program.’ In addition, I pride myself on navigating the 
challenges of Chapter 13. However, I must concede that the number of dismis-
sals out pace the number of discharges.”). 
 198. See Henry E. Hildebrand, III, A Response to a Pretend Solution, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2011) (providing statistics on chapter 13 outcomes in the 
Middle District of Tennessee to refute characterization of chapter 13 as a pre-
tend solution). 
 199. Greene, supra note 148. 
 200. Eggum et al., supra note 28. 
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pointing about a lack of respect for difference and allegations of 
turf protection.  
The debate over whether a model form for the chapter 13 
plan should be promulgated by the Advisory Committee on the 
Rules for Bankruptcy Procedure illustrates the rhetoric. A 
bankruptcy judge who organized a letter of 144 judges in oppo-
sition to the model form explained at a public hearing that the 
judges were “concerned because they feel by and large that 
Chapter 13 works in their jurisdictions.”201 In counter, another 
judge described the problem as “local [legal] culture,” calling it 
a “wonderful phrase to describe ‘what you can do is just fine, 
just don’t do it in my back yard.’”202 
We are confident that this work will upset the chapter 13 
community because at least some of our findings are outside 
the conventional wisdom, such as regarding whether conduit 
payments and wage orders increase plan completion.203 But we 
are even more certain that this disruption is necessary to reset 
the stale debate about chapter 13.204 The entrenchment of the 
status quo is holding back reform. Without a blueprint to 
 
 201. Transcript of Proceedings at 25, In Re Bankruptcy Rules Committee 
Hearing (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and 
-archives-rules-committees/transcripts (download Transcript of Bankruptcy 
Rules Public Hearing) [hereinafter Transcript of Proceedings] (statement of 
Brian Lynch); see also PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE AND OFFICIAL FORMS: JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY RULES Tab 2 (Jan. 23, 
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-and-archives-rules 
-committees/transcripts (download Testimony submitted for Hearing on Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure) (testimony 
of Bryan Lynch) (“Second, despite what proponents suggest, chapter 13 works 
very well in the legal communities throughout this country, and most courts 
. . . think that their local chapter 13 plan and processes work well for the 
needs of their debtors and creditors.”). 
 202. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 201, at 23 (testimony of Keith 
Lundin); see also id. at 24 (“They believe in having a form. They just want 
their form. And if the Committee would just adopt their form, the whole issue 
would go away and everybody would be happy.”). 
 203. Hank Hildebrand, Comments from Hank Hildebrand on Conduit 
Payments, CENT. DISTRICT INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www 
.centraldistrictinsider.com/2015/09/24/comments-from-hank-hildebrand-on 
-conduit-payments (“I have also had the opportunity to observe a significant 
number of jurisdictions with and without the ‘conduit’ component in their 
chapter 13 plans. All of us that are ‘conduit’ trustees have seen the result: 
More cases complete.”). 
 204. In this regard, we agree with Judge Keith Lundin, that master of un-
derstatement, who pronounced that “this local culture thing” is “killing Chap-
ter 13, but that’s just my opinion.” Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 201. 
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prompt grounded debate, chapter 13 reform faces even longer 
odds than chapter 13 debtors do in receiving discharges. 
  CONCLUSION   
Chapter 13 is in the bedrock of consumer bankruptcy, with 
Congress acting in each amendment after the enactment in 
1978 of the Bankruptcy Code to further increase chapter 13 use 
over chapter 7. But decade after decade, study after study has 
documented that approximately one-in-three chapter 13 cases 
end in a discharge.205 When critics have characterized this fact 
as a problem that merits law reform, the theory of local legal 
culture is trotted out to refute that the problem is the law it-
self.206 Instead, local legal culture treats the problems that 
debtors suffer in chapter 13 as individual, geographically spe-
cific, cultural, and readily addressable by professionals within 
the system. 
Our analysis illustrates that local legal culture can be in-
corporated into empirical research to inform chapter 13.207 A 
national sample lets us take account of local practice and de-
mographic variations, and regression modeling lets us control 
for the multiple influences on how people fare in chapter 13. 
Local legal culture may be a valid partial explanation for the 
widespread variation in chapter 13 practices, but it should not 
be allowed to obfuscate the measurable influences on debtor 
success. 
 
 205. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing a half-dozen studies 
conducted in 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). 
 206. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 804 (“The signif-
icance of local legal culture is obvious.”). 
 207. Id. at 861 (“While data are scarce in most areas of legal policymaking, 
there has been a recent trend toward statistical studies of the bankruptcy sys-
tem. The data presented here about local legal cultures, however, suggest that 
some caution about certain empirically based analyses of the bankruptcy sys-
tem is appropriate. Many statistical analyses of bankruptcy use aggregated 
data to support their assertions. Aggregated studies do not account for local 
differences that might yield very different pictures about the operation of the 
bankruptcy system. The usefulness of such data analyses is problematic. If lo-
cal legal culture plays as strong a role in the bankruptcy process and its out-
comes as these data suggest, then models that do not include indicators of lo-
cal effects are incomplete. Unfortunately, some local effects are difficult to 
quantify for statistical models. Researchers might use case studies and other 
qualitative data to supplement statistical modeling in some cases. Without 
some accounting for local variation, even those who are willing to do empirical 
research may miss the underlying reality.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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This Article is the first analysis to bring together three 
crucial elements: (1) an individual-level, national sample of 
hundreds of cases; (2) dozens of variables that recognize the 
multiple actors and processes that shape bankruptcy practice; 
and (3) regression modeling that accounts for local effects. We 
construct statistical models that draw on our contextual 
knowledge of chapter 13 and leading theories of financial dis-
tress from law and sociology. The result is a list of factors that 
can be the guideposts for debates about whether reform is 
needed to chapter 13. 
The poor outcome for the majority of chapter 13 debtors is 
not immutable. Though additional research and normative de-
bate is needed to chart the best opportunities to improve chap-
ter 13, we hope our study sparks a fiery debate, smothered for 
the last decades by local legal culture. While bankruptcy may 
never be as “uniform” as contemplated by the U.S. Constitu-
tion,208 the law can better serve its goals of rehabilitating debt-
ors and repaying creditors by looking across local variation to 
identify levers for reform. 
 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
